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Abstract 
 
This thesis is an investigation of possible solutions to the Hard Problem in philosophy of 
mind. The problem describes the difficulty of explaining the abstract, experiential content of 
consciousness within the framework of empirical science.  I here refer to the Hard Problem as 
it was put forth by David Chalmers (1995). 
The main purpose in this thesis is to investigate how a phenomenological 
understanding of consciousness can be used to supplement the effort to find an explanation to 
the relationship brain and mind. 
In order to find a plausible way in which this can be done, I discuss some different 
explanatory models for how consciousness can be understood and explained. Here I look at 
the difference between causal and constitutive types of explanations, and conclude that a 
plausible way to answer the Hard Problem is to find a constitutive explanation for how 
consciousness is realized (Craver 2007).  
With this in mind some of the different efforts to explain consciousness are explored, 
with a special emphasis on reductive theories, such as the physiclaistic mind/brain identity 
theory and functionalism. As there are some evident problems with reductive physicalism as it 
is found in for example the mind/brain identity theory, I focus especially on functionalism and 
the way to explain consciousness proposed by this theory. In relation to this I also discuss the 
separation between role filler and role- functionalism (McLaughlin 2006).  
Both these functionalistic theories get far in terms of explaining mental states, but 
there are still some difficulties connected to making sense of the experiential or qualitative 
aspects of consciousness. But by supplementing the theory with a phenomenological 
understanding of consciousness, as it is described in my reading of Alva Nöe’s enacted 
approach, it is possible for functionalism to give a stronger account for the realization of 
consciousness. 
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Preface 
 
This thesis is written as a contribution to the discussion around David Chalmers’ Hard 
Problem in Philosophy of mind. But more importantly it is also an investigation of how the 
phenomenological understanding of consciousness can contribute as an explanatory factor in 
the effort to explain the evident gap between body and mind. I was motivated by the intuitive 
understanding of experiential consciousness found in the phenomenological writings by 
amongst others Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, to find out how this way of 
describing consciousness could work within the framework of analytical philosophy. My 
thought was initially that analytic philosophy of mind could benefit from the profound 
understanding of experience and consciousness offered by phenomenology, and that this 
insight could be used as a starting point or a supplement in order to come up with a better 
explanation of the relationship between mental states and the physical world. 
 In order to find a plausible way for phenomenology to supplement analytical 
philosophy of mind I have also had to undertake a thorough investigation of this approach to 
consciousness. As this is an area in which I have had rather little experience up until now, 
writing this thesis has been an interesting and educational project. 
 In the end I hope to show that it is in some respects possible to get a better 
understanding of the relationship between experiential consciousness and the physical world. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
In this thesis I look at Chalmers’ (1995) Hard Problem of philosophy, and discuss some 
possible solutions to it.  In order to come up with an answer to the Hard Problem it is 
necessary to explain the relationship between conscious experience and the physical 
world/neural activity in the brain.  The main topic is an investigation  of how phenomenology, 
in the way it is described in Alva Nöe’s enacted approach can be used by analytic philosophy 
of mind for the sake of creating a better,  more satisfying answer to how we come to have the 
experienced and subjective  qualities  that  are connected with consciousness. This is done 
through a discussion of what an adequate theory of consciousness should look like, where I 
look at both causal and constitutive models for explanation.   I later move on to a discussion 
of the problems connected to some of the analytical explanations of consciousness, and 
propose some ways in which the phenomenological understanding of consciousness can be 
used to supplement these theories.  In conclusion I propose that the phenomenological way to 
account for consciousness can be used as a supplement to functionalism in order for this 
theory to give an adequate explanation of the experiential consciousness. 
 
1.1 Historical Background 
 
In 1641 the French philosopher Rene Descartes published his “Meditations”, describing how 
the world can be understood as split into two different substances.
1
 One is the  physical  
world,  or what  Descartes  called res extensa,  which is observable  and open  to  empirical  
research  through  our  senses.   The other one, res cogitas is the immaterial or abstract 
substance of our consciousness; our experience of the world along with thoughts and 
feelings. These two different substances were supposed to be connected in the pineal gland, 
and this connection provided for the interaction between the physical body and the 
immaterial m i n d .   Since the mind is perceived as something that  i s  without any 
physical substance it  is not available for standard physical research, or even submitted 
                                               
1 In addition to this Descartes also describes God as being a third substance (Descartes 2012) 
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to physical laws.  In order to make inquiries, research and explain consciousness then, 
the only way of gaining knowledge is through int r o spect io n , as consciousness is out 
of reach for empirical methods of research.  
This dualistic notion of two different kinds of substances, one for the physical 
and one for the mental, has left deep traces all the way up to modern philosophy in 
terms of how we understand the relation between body and mind.  The theory, with its 
problematic dualistic aspect has also led to some severe problems for philosophy, 
within both ontological and epistemological areas, and the problem of dualism is still 
today a major obstacle for the philosophy of mind, as it leads to what we now know as 
the mind/body problem.  The problem is that  Descartes’ solution to the mind body 
problem, with the pineal gland and some kind of consciousness spirits flowing 
through our veins in order to make the will of consciousness manifest in the physical 
body, is not  on account with what  we know to be true  in the  light of modern  
science.  The relation that  connects the mind and the body thus need to be explained 
differently, or else we will simply have to accept that  our conscious minds have no 
connection to the physical world in which we live, and that  our conscious selves must 
be understood  as something  that  is closed within  the  body/brain, committed  to 
only observing what is happening  to our objective bodies like a person who is 
watching a film at a movie screen. 
In order  to  solve the  problems  raised  by this  dualistic  perspective  of the  
relationship  between  body  and  mind,  many  possible solutions  have  been  
proposed. Explanations have focused on how it is possible for a non-physical entity 
like consciousness to somehow influence the physical body or brain.   For those who 
do not think such an explanation will ever be possible, an alternative to the dualistic 
picture has been proposed, where the subjective consciousness are reduced to physical 
states. In this case consciousness can be explained by these physical states, rather than 
as something that differs from the physical world. 
In modern philosophy of mind, the mind/body dualism of Descartes is to a 
large extent regarded as an insufficient explanation of consciousness. This means that 
most philosophers, with some exceptions, such as Zimmerman (2004) and Lowe 
(1992) wish to avoid this kind of fundamental distinction between body and mind.  
Nonetheless, for many theories in the field of philosophy of mind, dualism is still a 
problem it is hard  to  get  away  from,  without  having  to  deny  the  existence  of the  
subjective and qualitative experiential  mode of consciousness all together.  None the 
less it is a strong tendency on the part  of neuroscience, and even in philosophy of 
mind to figure out a way in which consciousness can be reduced to a physical 
instance,  something that  belongs to,  and  is the  product  of the  physical  world.   
The reason for this is that consciousness either have to be something that is possible to 
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explain within the physical framework modern science operates by today,  or this 
framework will need to be altered extensively.  This option does, as stated  above, 
look like the best way to go about the problem of consciousness to most of the current 
scientists and philosophers in the field. As the other option, dualism, allows for there 
to exist something mystical and independent form normal physics, a notion that is 
rarely the interest, or position taken by scientifically minded people. 
So the modern, scientific way of explaining consciousness is as something 
physical, most likely neurological action and signaling in the brain. Modern  
neuroscientists work strenuously  to find neural  entities  or structures that  correlate  
with qualitative experience in order to show how the brain  is connected  to,  and  
responsible for consciousness. This view is supported in philosophy by reductive 
physicalism and other similar reductive theories, but as I will discuss in the course of 
this thesis, there are still some deep problems to the idea of reducing mental states 
down to physical states in the brain. 
 
1.2 The Hard Problem 
 
 
The problem that  arise in relation to what I described above, have echoed through philosophy  
of mind,  and  the  core of the  problems  has been pointed  to by amongst others Thomas  
Nagel (1974).  In the famous essay “What is it like to be a bat?”  He points to the difficulty of 
explaining objectively, or even doing scientific/empirical research on the felt and experienced 
quality of consciousness. According to the standard understanding of consciousness found in 
analytical philosophy of mind, a defining aspect of conscious experience is that it is 
subjective, an inner state that is not susceptible to objective observation of any kind.  Nagel’s 
worry was that even though a scientist  can find out  all there  is to know about  the  physical 
aspects  of a bat,  or any  other  living being for that  matter, one does still  not  get  any  
insight into  the experience of being a bat  (or that  other person etc.).  How the bat  
experiences itself and the world around it remains hidden, and no matter how hard we look at 
it, even if we open up its head and gaze directly  at  its brain,  will get us any closer to how it 
feels to fly or having sonar vision.  This problem  lies at  the  heart  of the  physical reduction  
of mental  states,  and  thus  it is essential  also for neuroscience when they try to understand 
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and explain the foundation  of consciousness, and why we come to have this experience of 
our lives. 
The problem, and the way it was pointed out by Nagel, was later adopted and 
developed by David Chalmers (1995).  In his article “Facing up to the Problem of 
Consciousness” he formulated what we now know as the Hard Problem of philosophy in 
mind.  He did this by contrasting Nagel’s problem of finding out what it is like to be 
something/someone in terms of experience with other problems tended to by neuroscience, 
such as finding out and describing the difference between wakefulness and sleep, and being 
conscious versus unconscious and other  similar problems connected to  neural  activity.    
The difference is that questions of the latter kind are available to scientific inquiry and 
research because they are determinable by observing the brain. The matter of solving these 
kinds of problems is one of having the right kind of instruments, and an understanding of how 
these things should be measured.   If these things are in order, the question should be 
answerable within the existing framework of modern science.  In other words the question is 
perceived as possible to explain, and the only things that are missing are the details of the 
supposed explanation.  
But  this  is not  the  case with  the  Hard  Problem,  according  to  the  reasons  I 
mentioned  above.  The problem of how consciousness should be explained,  and how it 
relates to the body when it is understood  as irreducible to physical substance  (the mind/body 
problem)  is not  a question  with  an  available  physicalistic  or scientific answer, because  it 
is not clear exactly how consciousness can be reduced to a physical,  or at  least  scientifically 
viable instance.   But how then can we hope to explain the fact that we are conscious? For 
intuitively we do know that we experience the world, as we are always somehow related to, or 
intended towards it.  
 
1.3 Consciousness  
 
The word “consciousness” has many different meanings, depending on the context in which it 
is used, and the person who uses it.  To be absolutely clear about the way “consciousness” is 
used here, I will say a little bit about how I understand the term. 
  Consciousness, as the term is used here, refers to the subjective and experiential 
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 qualities of mental  states,  and the first person perspective  we have on the world.  In other 
words I use consciousness in more or less the same way as it was done by Nagel (1974) and 
Chalmers (1995) in the formulation of the Hard Problem, or what can be referred to as qualia.  
This  way to understand and talk  about  consciousness should be separated  from, and  be 
understood  differently  than,  a reference to the  physical state  of being conscious,  as 
opposed to  being unconscious  (in  a coma or dead  for example).   It should also be separated 
from the background states of experiential consciousness, or the mode of consciousness we 
are in.  This second division is more complicated  to get a hold on, but  according to Chalmers  
(2000) there  are probably many  more or less normal  mental  states  that  can be fitted  into  
this  category,  such as for example being tired,  inattentive, euphoric and  so on.  These are 
all contexts that influence the way we experience bot ourselves and the situated environment 
we are in. These two kinds of “consciousness” are both necessary and important factors for 
the qualitative aspect of consciousness that I refer to.  To have such a subjective experiential  
consciousness it  is crucial  that  we are  conscious and  not  unconscious, and  as we are 
conscious we are also necessarily  in some kind  of mood,  or a given background  states  that  
dictates  some of some of the  way we experience the  world. In order  to determine  and  
describe these  underlying  states  of conscious experience it is often enough to look at  the  
brain  and  it’s neural  activity.   The  state  of being conscious has been found to correlate 
with a specific kind of neural activity,  and if a doctor or scientist wants to determine  whether  
a person is conscious or not it should be possible to determine  this  according  to whether  
such activity  is present  or not. The same is true for other kinds of mental states or 
consciousness; their presence can often be determined by activity at a more or less special and 
restricted area of the brain.   But as stressed by the Hard Problem, no such correlation is able 
to give us information about the subjective feeling associated with the neural activity. 
The point is that consciousness is subjective rather than objective when we use the 
qualitative descriptions mentioned above.  It is something  we have access to through  
introspection,  and  personal  reports  about  the  way the  world is perceived by the  person in 
question.   It is also expressed through behavior, as our acts tend to reflect cognitive contents.    
Another essential factor in relation to consciousness (as it is understood here) is that we, when 
we are conscious always are conscious of something.  We are conscious of ourselves and of 
our surroundings, and are in addition able to perceive of other people/beings as conscious 
subjects as well. So it is safe to say that  there does seem to be some kind of relation  between 
the outside world and consciousness, even though it seems to be a difference between 
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consciousness and the kind of objective substance  that  can be measured and described in in a 
third  person perspective.  What separates the two is the way in which they are accessible for 
us in terms of research.  When we want to explain a certain aspect of the world it is usually 
just a matter of empirical studies and experiments that can be performed within the 
framework of normal science and explained in accordance with physical laws. In the case of 
consciousness on the other hand, it is difficult to see how such objective studies can be done, 
because consciousness itself is understood as a subjective feeling. 
The  way  the  term  consciousness  is used  in  this  paper  is in  other  words  as 
experience, the subjective  or qualitative aspect  of the mind, or what  Chalmers  calls qualia.  
When referring to consciousness in this way, it becomes clear that  even though it is still 
possible to describe it as somehow connected to the brain, but it is difficult to see how we can 
say that  consciousness is the same as a given brain state,  or even more general neural 
activity.  This is so, because detecting neural activity is not the same thing as detecting the felt 
experience a person has of its own self and surroundings 
 
1.4 Why is Consciousness an Area of Interest for 
Philosophy? 
 
Science and philosophy has long been connected, to the point where the two were seen as 
literally the same thing, all the way from ancient Greek philosophy in the antique and up to at 
least the time of Descartes.   Science is still very much a part of philosophy today, but it 
seems like this relationship might not go the other way around.   For  instead  of conducting  
philosophical  reasoning  and  logical arguments, the method of modern natural science are 
prone to use empirical research and  mathematical  calculations  to prove the  truth of their  
hypothesis.   The  methods  used by philosophy and science respectively are different, but the 
goal of the two are basically the same, to find out the truth about,  and as such explain the 
world and the subjects living in it.  But if the world can be made sense of by science and its 
physical laws, is it then any room left for philosophy.  I think it is, as philosophy of science is 
still committed to clearing the grounds for natural science by questioning, discussing and 
optimizing the framework and methods used by natural science.  But, even though philosophy 
does seem to be a useful tool for science, in terms of providing guidelines and modifications  
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to the way research is done and conclusions are made, in the case of cognitive science and 
philosophy of mind the relationship is even more on of mutual dependency. 
The reason for this is that the concept of consciousness is difficult to grasp within the 
framework of normal natural science. The problem is that science usually is concerned with 
the kind of problems that are solvable through a normal use of scientific methods, but in the 
case of the rather abstract understanding of consciousness it seems like a different approach is 
needed in order to overcome the obstacles associated with the problem of the relation between 
brain and mind (i.e. the Hard Problem). What is needed is to determine a way in which 
consciousness can be understood as a physical entity, or at least a kind of entity that can be 
explained within a scientific framework (biology, psychology etc.).  Here I think it is up to 
philosophy of mind to give a clear formulation of how consciousness can be understood in 
order for it to be put into an already existing scientific explanatory model, or alternatively 
provide a new model by which consciousness can be explained.  The point is that,  for now at 
least, neuroscience only has the appropriate tools to deal with research on the brain, and  as 
such it  is possible for scientists  in the  neuroscientific  field to find out  a lot about  how the 
brain  and the mind are correlated.   What  is still needed is a way for these correlations  to be 
put  into a system able to give an actual  explanation  of the correlation,  but  due to  the  
intrinsic  characterization of subjective  and  experiential consciousness it is not really 
possible to give an objective scientific description of this. The intrinsic characterization of 
mental stats does here refer to the notion that the experiential aspects of consciousness are 
understood to be hidden from public view. In other words these states are understood to be 
subjective, and as such inaccessible for scientifically guided empirical studies.  So philosophy 
will have to do the job of giving scientific sense to the concept of consciousness. This is 
typically done by reducing consciousness to something that is within the reach of a scientific 
system, and these types of explanatory models will be the focal point of my thesis.  But other 
suggestions have also been made, for example it is imaginable that the framework of physical 
laws can be altered or extended in order for consciousness to fit in (Chalmers 
2006), or it is possible to hang on to the more mystical concept of dualism.  One of the more 
extreme solutions to the problem is found in the skeptic views of Daniel Dennett (1991) and 
Paul Church land (1981), who denies the existence of consciousness all together due to its 
unscientific qualities. 
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1.5 Phenomenology 
 
The necessary link between philosophy and science when it comes to providing an  adequate  
explanation  of consciousness,  has  been an  inspiration  for writing  this thesis, and a lot of 
inspiration  comes from phenomenology and the phenomenological understanding of 
consciousness.  Phenomenology, in its classical form as it is found in the works of amongst 
others Edmund Husserl (2012) and Martin Heidegger (2000, 
2007), is built on what might be called an unscientific ground, and is not constrained by 
scientific method.  Rather this philosophical direction embraces introspection and first person 
studies as a way to gain crucial information about what it is like to be a subject living in an 
objective world.  One of the goals of phenomenology is to make sense of both  the  world and  
consciousness through  a skilled form of introspection, where the structures of how we access 
the world is discovered, and is as such a project that  includes both ontological and 
epistemological investigations.  The starting point for a phenomenological theory/description 
is the human being as a living subject in a given environment. The question of whether  we 
are conscious or not does not even arise,  and  neither  does the  question  of whether  the  
world is real (as opposed to a mere illusion (Hume 2010, Leibniz 2001)).  In phenomenology 
these things are taken for granted as they are both there, given by the way we exist.  Instead of 
focusing on the world, and whether it is really there, phenomenology is occupied with the 
way it (the world) is manifested in our minds.  The fact that we are conscious beings are 
crucial for this manifestation, had we not been conscious there would not be a world either, at 
least not for us. The notion that there is a world and a mind/subject that relates to it thereby 
stands undisputed. What is crucial for phenomenology is rather the way in which the world is 
given, or shows itself for us.  As such, the theory is deeply intertwined with consciousness 
and psychology (of the introspective kind). 
The aim of phenomenology is to make sense of, and explain what consciousness is, and what 
it must be like in order for the world to appear for us the way it does, and both  Husserl and  
Heidegger (along with  Sartre  and  Merlau-Ponty) offer extensive descriptions  of the mind 
and how it relates to the world.  In order to get an as clear as possible description of 
consciousness, the first step of phenomenology is to bracket the world, in a way that takes the 
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world in itself out of the picture
2
.  In this way only the  most  important  thing  is left,  
consciousness,  or the  way the  world is perceived by  the  observing  subject.    This  
“bracketing”  is referred  to  as a phenomenological or eidetic reduction,  and is meant  to be a 
way for the  phenomenological  thinker  to come closer to consciousness in itself instead  of 
the  world in itself.  The  meaning of the  word eidetic is something  similar to “see things  
clearly” or “seeing the  clear picture”,  and this refers to the notion  that  only by taking  the 
world in itself out of the picture  do we get a clear insight into the ways of the mind.  This is 
partly due to the phenomenal character of consciousness, or the fact that consciousness is 
always directed towards something in an intentional manner.  In other words, consciousness 
has a phenomenal character (hence the name of the philosophical direction), and is always 
intended towards something, be that the world, a memory or another person. So the  point  of 
the  reduction  is to see the  phenomena  as they  occur for the mind, to say it with Husserl 
(2012); consciousness is a transcendental instance,  as it in a manner  transcends  the world. 
The crucial point to take away from this is that only by viewing consciousness on its 
own, without concern for its physical relation to the world (the Hard Problem) can we hope to 
really understand it.  The phenomenological description  is, as stated earlier,  concerned with  
the  way the  world is presented  in our minds,  and  the  phenomenology of especially Husserl 
and Heidegger describes many crucial factors of the way we relate to the world that  I will not 
go further into here. The main conclusion is that both the world and the mind/consciousness 
seem to be given, or constituted by the way the two relate to each other.  Had we not been 
conscious, no world would be constituted, or show up for us, and had there been no world 
(including our own and other beings physical bodies) for us to be conscious of there would be 
no conscious- ness. A phenomenological theory does in other words offer a thorough 
description of consciousness (in itself), and as such gives us a way in which to understand it.  
And clearly a good explanation of consciousness should start with a careful understanding of 
the phenomena to be explained. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
2 Epoche (Husserl 2012)  
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1.6 Phenomenology as a Supplement to 
Functionalism 
 
From the discussion of phenomenology above, we see that the “mystical” notion of 
consciousness is treated somewhat differently by phenomenology than it is by the more 
scientifically oriented tradition of analytic philosophy.   My main intention  for writing  this  
thesis  has  been to  investigate  how the  Hard  Problem  (Chalmers  1995) appears  in the  
light of the  Phenomenological  understanding of consciousness.   My thought has been that 
the understanding of phenomenological consciousness can be helpful for analytic philosophy 
and neuroscience when it comes to bridging the “explanatory gap” between the physical body 
and the abstract concept of mind.   The main topic of this thesis is thereby an investigation of 
whether a phenomenological insight into consciousness can be used as a supplement to 
analytic philosophy in order to better the understanding of how consciousness relates to the 
physical world, and how this can be done.   
In what way can phenomenology be used as a supplement? And which analytical 
theories of consciousness are prone for this kind of supplement? Are  some theories  more 
closely linked  with  phenomenology,  and  as such  a  better theory  to  supplement with  the  
phenomenological  insights?   These  are the  kinds  of questions  I deal with in this thesis, and 
in order to arrive at  conclusions in relation to these, I will also investigate  some of the 
foundations  of classical analytic  theories of consciousness.  
I start  out by discussing two kinds of explanatory  structures that  can be used on 
consciousness,  in order  to  explain  how it  is connected  with  the  physical  world. An 
explanation of this relationship can be understood either as causal, or as constitutive.   In the  
former kind of explanation  the  answer to the  Hard  Problem  will be characterized  as 
describing a link of cause and effect between physical states  in the brain  and  the  
experiential  content  of the  mind.   By investigating, and arguing for the use of causal 
explanations in modern science, I shed some light on the way this kind of explanatory model 
can be seen as relevant for the understanding of various phenomena.  The notion of a causal 
explanation also lays the grounds for how we can understand and use a constitutive 
explanatory model, when we want to explain how consciousness is realized by an empirically 
available entity or structure. 
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This leads to a discussion about constitutive explanations, what they are, and how they 
are put to use.  Here I will use work done by Carl Craver (2007) in order to illustrate both the 
method and purpose of this constitutive model for explanation. The  point  here is to get an 
explanation  that  does not  appeal  to a cause and effect relationship,  but  instead  has  as its  
goal to  explain  a phenomena  by  appealing  to the  underlying  structure of the way it is 
given (realized).   I will argue that  such an explanation  fits better  with what  is looked for in 
the  Hard  Problem,  as it does not demand  the same kind physical and temporal  structure as 
a causal explanation. 
After discussing the constitutive explanatory model, I will follow this up by looking at 
some different efforts to explain consciousness and the mind/body problem in such a 
constitutive manner.  The first theory I focus on is the mind/body identity theory, which, 
strictly in line with physical reductionism, holds that a mental state can be identified with a 
given state in the brain.  This kind of theory is closely related to neuroscience and cognitive 
research, as it assumes that  it will be enough to identify the brain states  that correlate with 
the mental  states  in order to explain it (as these two are essentially  the  same).   My 
argument here will be that  the  mind/body identity theory  fails to  explain  consciousness for 
very  much  the  same  reason  as  reductive physicalism  in general,  and,  instead  I will 
investigate  whether  functionalism  is a better  option in terms of finding an answer to the 
Hard Problem.  
In my discussion of functionalism we meet two different interpretations of the theory, 
role filler-functionalism and role-functionalism.  Both theories hold that  mental  states  can  
be described  as  functional  states,   the  relationship  between  sensory input,  behavioral  
output and other mental  states.  In role-functionalism  this relation itself (the functional  state)  
is identified with consciousness, while in the case of role- filler functionalism,  the  functional  
states  are used as designators  for the  underlying physical  states  that  are  taken  to  be the  
realizing  factor  for consciousness.   But  a problem  for both  is still that  even the  functional  
descriptions  does not  open up for an  understanding of the  intrinsic  qualities  of experiential  
consciousness as long as consciousness is understood  in the classical way it is described by 
Chalmers (1995) in relation to the Hard Problem.  These intrinsic qualities of consciousness 
can be seen as the subjective or private feeling of experience, and if this aspect cannot be 
accounted for by functionalism, it is unsuccessful in terms of explaining consciousness. 
Through  a thorough  review of the phenomenology as it is interpreted by Alva Nöe in 
his enacted  approach  to consciousness, I will argue that  both  kinds of functionalism  can be 
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possible to supplemented with  the  view of consciousness we meet here.  The enacted theory 
is, much like phenomenology in general, concerned with the way in which the world shows 
up for us in our consciousness, and what the mind must be like in order for this to happen.  In 
Nöe’s modernized phenomenology, it is a point to give scientific, empirical proof for why we 
should perceive of the conscious mind in the way it is stipulated by phenomenology, and as 
such there is hope that the theory can be taken seriously also by scientifically minded people.  
The main point of the enacted theory is to show that even though consciousness might be 
reduced to things that can be explained more or less scientifically, it takes more than a brain 
to constitute consciousness.  Following this, it is possible to understand the enacted theory as 
offering a way in which functional descriptions also can be used as denote the intrinsic, 
subjective experience that is consciousness. 
With the phenomenological and enacted comprehension of consciousness, I hope to be 
able to show that with a wider perspective on the constitution of consciousness it is possible 
to supplement the analytical theory of functionalism, in order to get a better understanding of 
the relationship between body and mind.  In my opinion the phenomenological  understanding 
of consciousness can prove to be an important factor  when it  comes to  bridging  the  
explanatory  gap  between  body  and  mind  as it  is formulated  in the  Hard  Problem  
because  it  offers an deeper understanding of consciousness, that  is closer to the way we 
intuitively  relate to both it and the world. I will also propose  an  alternative reading  of Nöe’s 
enacted  approach  that  can  be seen as handling  the Hard Problem  by explaining it away.  
This reading presuppose a view of consciousness as something  that  is already  both  present 
and presented  to us because we are able to perceive the  world and  act  in it.   As such, it is 
possible to say that a Hard Problem never arise, as consciousness is already explained and 
understood by virtue of this interactive relationship. 
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2 Causal and Constitutive 
Explanations 
 
The  notion  that  consciousness has a qualitative, subjective  and  inert  aspects reflects how 
we experience ourselves and the world around  us (qualia)  presents  some serious problems 
for  modern  neuroscience and philosophy  of mind (Chalmers  1996, Nagel 1974). This has 
rendered debate amongst philosophers about how this aspect of conscious life should best be 
understood and explained.  A starting point for most philosophers is the scientific 
understanding of the brain, and how the structure of this physical entity gives rise to 
conscious experience.  Most of the cells that  process the information  made available by the 
senses are found to be in the brain,  and most modern scientists and philosophers accepts that 
the brain plays a more or less (Nöe, phenomenological thinkers)  crucial role for the formation  
of conscious content.  This thought, that the  brain  somehow gives rise to  consciousness is 
also the  normally accepted  materialist view of consciousness, a branch  of philosophy 
holding that  the ultimate  nature  of the mind is physical, and that  there is no sharp contrast 
between physical matter and consciousness (Dennett 1991). The materialist view can also be 
seen as a contrasting answer to the  dualistic  thought  of body and  mind  stemming all the 
way from Descartes, who made a strong distinction  between the physical and extended  body 
and  the  spiritual  mind.   This  dualistic  way of thinking  survived  for a long time in the  
realm of psychology and philosophy  of mind, but  has in modern times,  to a large extent 
been abandoned  in favor of the  materialistic  view or other suitable  theories in order to 
transcend  the ontological gap that  materializes  between the  physical and  the  mental  in 
dualistic  thinking.   Descartes dualism (2012) led to numerous problems in the way we think 
of and understand consciousness.  His view of the strong division between the physical and 
the mental has to a large extent been refuted  by later  philosophers  and  scientist  (Chalmers  
1996) in such a way that  we no longer have to imagine the world to be made up of two 
completely different and incommensurable kinds of “materials”.  How this is done is not a 
pressing matter here, and  I will not  discuss it further,  but  it is none the  less important  to 
keep in mind that  there still are some traces of the Cartesian  view to be found in the way we 
talk and think  about  consciousness. 
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These traces can be found in the way we understand and think about conscious- ness 
and its physical “counterpart”, the brain, as two different types of phenomena (Yablo 1992).  
According to the materialist view in philosophy of mind there are no significant differences 
between physicality and conscious content, and one should not yield to talking about qualia as 
anything over and above the neurological signaling in the brain (Smart 1959). In spite of this 
there is, as stated above, still some dualistic traces to be found in the way the relationship 
between brain and consciousness is apprehended. The dualism is apparent in how mental 
phenomena on a regular basis are treated as something different than physical phenomena 
(Descartes 2012).  The dualistic  notion  is apparent also in the  materialistic  view where 
conscious content is often treated  as supervening  on physical action  in the  brain,  making it 
seem like what  is supervening  is not itself a physical substance  (Smart  1959).  This 
illustrates what lies at the heart of the Hard Problem (Chalmers 1995).  The still apparent di- 
vide between the mental  and the physical plays up the long standing  problem of how 
something  physical  can give rise to something  mental,  and  if and  how this  mental content 
in some way differs from the physical world. These are important questions, and strong 
arguments are needed to support any of the stands, but this will not be the problem developed 
here.  Whether  conscious content  and  experience can be proven to be something physical or 
something “over and above” the physical, the Hard Problem still illustrates  the question 
about  the relationship  between the physical and the mental  still needs further  discussion in 
order to answer both if and how the physical structure of the brain can give rise to 
consciousness. 
So the Hard Problem demonstrates the need for an answer to how conscious content 
can possibly stem from or be realized by the chemical processes and electric signals in the 
brain.  There is after all a big difference between what can be objectively observed and  tested  
for in terms  of third  person observation,  and  the  way what  is thus  measured  is 
experienced  by the  person  to  whom the  brain  belongs.   There is in other words some kind 
of division between the physics of the brain and the first person experience this physics gives 
rise to, the qualitative consciousness.  Thus the Hard Problem is a hard one, and an 
explanation for the sake of the understanding of the relationship between the two is needed. 
The  hard  problem  does in other  words need an explanation  of what  the  
relationship  is between the physical structure of the brain  and the conscious experience it 
gives rise to.  But what should an explanation addressing this question look like? And what 
enables an explanation to provide an acceptable answer?  In science and especially in 
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philosophy of science there are many theories and hypotheses about what a good explanation 
should look like. In this chapter  I will go through  a few of them in order to clarify what an 
explanation  of consciousness should contain,  and what kind of explanatory  fallacies should 
be avoided in the search for an understanding of how mental  phenomena  and conscious 
experience springs out of the brain. 
 
2.1 Causal Explanations 
 
Explanatory models are  often  based  on causal  and  constitutive forms of 
explanations, one of them,  or both  according to the  kind of explanation  the  question 
demands.   So the first step in the process of finding a solution to the Hard Problem should be 
to determine whether the relationship between brain and mind is causal or constitutive, and 
the widely accepted theory today is that this relationship should be seen as constitutive
3
.  
There are of course many reasons for this, and on a whole it seems like the constitutive 
explanation fits better with how consciousness relates to the physical structures and signaling 
in the brain (Craver 2007). At the same time the difference and relationship between 
constitutive and causal models of explanations is not always fully understood and expressed.  
To get a clearer understanding of this I will take a look at what is meant by both causal and 
constitutive explanation, and take a look at how they differ from each other and how they can 
be used in separate ways to explain given phenomena. 
Many explanations in science are answers to questions about the relationship between 
cause and effect, and these questions seek causal explanations. In standard modern  science a 
scientist  will probably  have to answer questions  of both  a causal and a constitutive 
character,  even though  it is often (Craver  2007) thought that  all scientific answers should 
be based on causal explanation  (but,  as we’ll see later  this might depend  on the  question  in 
need of explanation).  A causal explanation  is the default answer given to a so called “answer 
seeking why-question” (Ylikoski 2013, van Fraassen 1980), questions about why things are 
the way they are, and the normal way to respond to this is by appealing  to some kind of 
causal explanation,  making clear that  the reason  why a thing  is this  way rather  than  
                                               
3 3 Apparent  in the  way philosophers  of mind  build  their  explanations, all the  way from analytic and  
scientifically  inspired  thinkers  such as Crick and  Koch (2003) to the  more phenomenologically inspired  
theories  of Alva Nöe (2009) and Dan Zahavi  (2008). 
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another  is because something else caused it to be like that.  When asked about what might be 
the cause of a given event such as (to use a popular example first provided by David Hume 
(2010)) the movements of billiard balls, it seems reasonable to reply that the momentum of 
the cue or optionally the other billiard ball caused the ball to move. 
This  type  of explanation   seems adequate  enough  as  long as  the  cause  (one 
billiard  ball hitting  the  other)  is grounded  in provable  scientific facts (the  
momentum/energy is transferred from one billiard ball to the other causing the second ball to  
move).   However there  are still some deeply rooted  metaphysical  problems  connected  to  
the  causality  and  its  adequacy  as  a  legitimate  ground  for explanation. Some of the  
issues here stem as far back as David Hume’s “An Enquiry  concerning Human  
Understanding” from 1748 (2010), where he denies the  possibility  of proving the  existence  
of causal  relations,  thus  making  causal  explanations  invalid  from a metaphysical/analytic 
point of view.   An answer  supported  by a causal  form of explanation  will according to 
Hume appeal  to the  inductive  fallacy, where the  only thing really lending support to the 
explanation  is that  the relation has been observed before. Turning back to the question about 
how to explain the movement of a billiard ball across the billiard table, there is an observed 
correlation between one ball hitting and other, seemingly causing it to move.  According to 
Hume the only thing that  is really a fact here is that  every time a ball hits  the  other  this  
one will also start  to move, but  to say that  one is actually  observing the one causing the 
other  can never be really true according to Hume.  To say that the movement of the ball that 
hits the other also causes it to move is to confuse correlation and causation, and to confuse the 
two would be to step into an inductive fallacy. This way there is nothing implicit about  
correlation,  the fact that  a given thing have a habit  of happening  in a specific order  that  
makes it true  that  they  stand  in a causal relationship  to each other,  so analytic  predictions  
cannot be made from this base alone. 
Many  attempts have  been  made  to  avoid  this  fallacy of course,  but  from a 
metaphysical  point of view it seems like there  might be no final solution to Hume’s problem.   
The  way science is done  today  none  the  less seem compatible  with  the use of the  causal  
method  when a (scientific)  phenomenon  is explained  and  causal relationships  can  be 
tested  in different kinds  of experiments.    If an “effect” never occurs without the presence of 
a given cause (or causes), this would imply that the explained phenomenon or relationship is 
one of cause and effect. From a scientific point of view causal relationships can be revealed 
through experimenting, by checking which things are able to alter or cause other things/events 
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to happen.  The same is true for many of the other “causal problems” of the inductive fallacy. 
The important thing is that for everything that happens, for all phenomena that exist there is 
some sort of explanation or reason (scientifically speaking) for its occurrence (Craver 2007). 
The notion of such a principle originates amongst others from the German mathematician and 
philosopher G.W Leibniz.  His principle of sufficient reason states  that  nothing can  happen  
without  a reason,  and  that  for every event there  must  exist  a reason sufficient for that  
event to happen  (Leibniz 1989). But  this explanation  or reason is not  always readily  
available,  and  the  job of the  scientist  is not  only to understand these  reasons,  but  also to 
make explanatory  representations of the  phenomena. A representative explanation represents 
the phenomenon by explaining why it is the way it is, and it is here we meet the problem of 
how an adequate explanation should look like. Much effort has been laid down, partly  by 
philosophers of science to make explicit exactly what should be expected of an explanation  
to make it a good one, and how such criteria need to be fulfilled in order to make up a good, 
coherent explanation. 
One such strategy for making out what scientific explanations should look like is 
found in Carl Hempel’s (1965) Covering Law model (Craver 2007). This model makes 
scientific explanations that appeal to causality plausible by proving how an outcome can be 
expected (predicted) on the basis of physical laws. The explanation is set up as an argument 
with an if-then structure where basic physical laws serve as premises. The  argument then  
shows how in certain  conditions  the arguments  conclusion (the phenomenon  to be 
explained)  is to be expected  on the  basis of these physical laws. Thus Hempel (1965) makes 
explanation a matter of using deduction, and thus avoid the inductive fallacy. On the other 
hand there are, according to Craver (2007) and of course many others, severe problems about 
causality left unanswered by the covering law model. First it is no restrictions embedded in 
the theory that makes it possible to separate between real physical laws and mere accidents.  
As both can be empirically accounted for, it is crucial for the model of covering law that the 
explanatory relevant physical laws can be separated from mere correlations and 
generalizations.  Another problem for covering law is that it does not provide a sufficient 
mechanism to deal with explanatory relevance.  A successful model of explanation needs to 
be able to account for the factors that are actually relevant for the explanation of the 
phenomenon under discussion and which ones are not.  This moment of critique has also been 
stated earlier by amongst others Wesley Salmon, who pointed the problem of relevance by 
showing the way Hempel’s method could yield true explanations for false conclusions 
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(Salmon1984).  To find the relevant factors that  can genuinely be posed as causes, scientists 
can of course do some surveys or experiments  to see what the actual  explanation  of a 
phenomenon is (van Fraassen 1980), but in a model that  treats  explanations  the same as 
arguments  irrelevant factors can possibly sneak in without  any danger of altering the 
conclusion, and as such, Hempel is again prone to fall into the inductive  fallacy. This is 
because the true premisses of the argument leads to consistent conclusions even with the  
addition  of irrelevant extra  arguments.   In addition,  the  model of covering law, with its 
focus on how the phenomenon is to be expected (by deduction)  on the background  of the  
physical  law and  relevant  circumstances  is not  able  to  account for the  many  
circumstances  in which all the  relevant premises are present without yielding the predicted  
outcome. 
Hempel’s mission is to make scientific explanations indisputable by setting them up as 
logically consistent arguments, where the conclusion of the argument or the occurrence of the 
phenomenon is seen as a necessary consequence of the premisses. But, as shown by Craver  
(2007), the theory  is not altogether  coherent with the reality  of science and how scientific 
explanations  are actually  made, an important factor being that  scientific explanations  
seldom or never are understood  as arguments.   Bas van Fraassen (1980), for example, was 
aware of this and tried  to solve some of the problems in Hempel’s method by adopting  a 
version of an “anti-realist” view of Hempel’s explanatory  model.   He follows Hempel’s way 
of setting explanations up as logical constructions, but he switches out Hempel’s logical 
relation of a cause and effect with the relation between question and answer.  The reason for 
this is that van Fraassen believes that Hempel’s understanding of scientific explanation is a 
misunderstanding of how scientific explanations are made.  To find scientific answers and 
make explanations based on empirical research is not a matter of describing a relationship 
between cause and effect; rather it should be understood as en effort in terms of finding an 
answer to the kind of answer seeking-why questions I mentioned earlier in reference to 
Ylikoski. The point is that scientific explanation is a process of creative construction of 
explanatory models, where the aim is to find answers to questions, rather than an effort to 
reduce the phenomenon to the premises on which it is based.  So instead of answering if a 
given phenomenon is equal to some deductive argument van Fraassen focuses on the why 
form of the question, and he answers by appealing to the best avail- able reason/cause. By 
doing this, van Fraassen avoids some of the inductive fallacies that Hempel falls into.  For 
example, through  van Fraassen’s  approach  it is possible to avoid some of the problems that  
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are connected  with explanatory  asymmetry  and relevance,  by doing an evaluation  of the  
kind of context  the  questions  are asked in relation  to.  This means that the explanatory 
relevant causes can be determined by looking at what the relevant cause is in the given 
context of the specific incident that is under research. This being a clearly pragmatic strategy, 
is unquestionably more on terms with how research and explanations are actually performed 
by scientists.  A point that is crucial for Craver (2007) in his view of causal explanations. 
So, according to both Ylikoski (2013) and van Fraassen (1980) there is a clear 
misunderstanding in Hempel’s understanding of how the link between cause and effect should 
be understood.   By appealing  to a subjective  and  pragmatic  understanding of this  relation,  
with  support  from how scientific explanations  actually  are  made (based on answering, not 
discovering), many of the inductive fallacies connected with causality  can be avoided.  In 
result, this view serves as a solution not only to some of the problems encountered by 
Hempel, but also to those pointed to by Hume.  This more proper understanding of how 
science explains the world is also crucial for the explanatory theory developed by Craver 
(2007). 
Further criteria  for what  makes  up  a  good (causal)  explanation   other  than 
Hempel’s deductive  nomological theory  of explanation  is in other  words needed  in order  
to  give an  adequate  model or theory  for what  causal,  scientific explanations should look 
like. The shortcomings in the covering law theory pointed out by Craver serves well to 
illustrate the kind of criteria a well formulated model of explanation should meet.   A 
sufficient form of explanation  is one that accommodates  the  lacks described  above, and,  
according  to Craver  (2007) meets certain  criteria  in order to count as a good explanation  of 
the  given phenomenon.   These  constraints, or the necessary content of a causal explanation,  
can be summarized  as (1) mere temporal sequences are not explanatory, i.e. the explanation  
needs to describe an internal  relationship  between cause and effect over and above the  fact 
that  one comes after  the other.  (2) Causes explain effects and not vice versa, the relationship 
between cause and effect is asymmetric.  (3) Causally independent effects of a common cause 
do not explain one another.  (4) Causally irrelevant phenomena are not explanatory, all the 
factors or phenomena in the explanation need to be relevant for that explanation or else they 
are not explanatory. (5) Causes need not make effects probable to explain them, improbable 
effects are still effects, and the explanation must allow them to take place (Craver 2007 p. 26). 
A good causal explanation  thus  needs to be careful in terms  of fulfilling these 
criteria,  in order  for the  causal  explanation  to  hold in a real explanatory  way.   In many 
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theories of causal explanation  the notion of causality  entails some kind of over- lap between 
the cause and effect, as in the examples given by Craver in “Explaining the brain”  (2007).  
One of these are the theory  of mark transmission  (MT)  proposed by amongst  others Wesley 
Salmon, which incorporates  a view of causality  as a form of touching  between  the  cause 
and  effect in which the  cause transmits some kind of mark  on the  effect.   The  point  here  
is to  look at  the  relevant  particles  or objects in the  causal  explanation  as individual  
“world-lines” in a space-time  diagram (a Minkowskian space-time  diagram  (Geroch  
1978)).  This  goes to show how some processes have actual  causal relevance, while others  
have not,  by looking at  how an impact  can  be made  by one object,  so that  it  changes  the  
world-line of another. The  difference is made  between  a process that  successfully alters  the  
world line of another  beyond the  point  of interaction and those who merely show an impact  
on the place where the lines meet.  This is surely a nice way to discriminate between a 
causally relevant process and a process that only seemingly makes any kind of causal 
difference.  The transmission  theory  is not  on the  other  hand  able to accommodate and 
explain processes where there  is no actual  connection or “touching”  between to world-lines.  
But causality in neuroscience (as described by Craver) does not entail this kind of touching as 
a necessary factor of causality.   Many neurobiological cases do not  demand  any  direct  
connection  between  cause and  effect, such as inhibitory mechanisms that  prevents  or stops 
the occurrence of a phenomenon  by the creation of a gap or disconnection in the neural 
structure of the brain (negative causal relation- ships).  In other words, this theory also shows 
weakness in terms of giving accurate explanations, at least in the field of neurobiology.   
According to Craver  (2007) the MT theory’s explanatory  relevance lies in placing the  world 
within  a causal frame- work, but  even though  the model might be successful at  this it does 
not accurately discriminate  between causal connections relevant for a given phenomenon and 
which factors are not, and as such the MT theory is not an adequate  theory of explanation 
because it does not meet all the standards for accurate  explanations  as they are set up by 
Craver. 
Another important weakness in the kind of theory we meet here is that it keeps making 
an appeal to the causal “link” between cause and effect.  The  theories  support  themselves  
by appealing  to connections  on the  fundamental level, and as such end up with letting  the  
same old “causal worry” present  itself here.  The “remedy” for the problem of causal 
relevance as it is proposed by Craver (2007) is to look at science from a somewhat different 
angle, and appeal to how modern science is actually done.  The strength  of the appeal  to and 
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need for strong  causal connections on the fundamental level depends on whether  we treat  
science as something that  should be reduced  to the  most fundamental level of physics or can 
science be multileveled and split up in a hierarchical  manner  to give each level a 
fundamentally constitutive function.   In Carl  Craver’s  “explaining  the  brain”  (2007) we 
meet  a fundamentally anti-fundamentalist view, where there  is no need to  ground  the  
“higher  level” sciences in more fundamental structures if the purpose  is to explain a 
phenomenon  or mechanism  on the  stated  level.  This makes it possible to treat every level 
as self-sufficient with its own explanatory relevance, avoiding reductionist problems such as 
uncertainties about causal relationships on lower levels. 
The notion of multiple levels in science is founded on the notion of mechanisms 
working on different levels of interest for scientific research.  Although all mechanisms are 
built up by institutions on a lower level, the working of the specific mechanism is seen as 
working on a distinct level. One can in other words make a demarcation be- tween levels, by 
letting the working mechanism stand as an indicator of the particular level. In this way 
explaining how the mechanism work on a given level to constitute a phenomenon,  does not 
demand  any further  confirmation  or explanation  on a lower level, as long as it is sufficient 
to explain the phenomenon of interest. 
The mechanism itself can be described as an activity that to some extent can stand as a 
causal explanation for the occurrence of a given phenomenon, by being sufficient and 
necessary for that phenomenon (Craver 2007). This implies that without the underlying 
mechanism the phenomenon would not occur. 
According to Craver, it is thus necessary to look at the phenomena to be explained in 
order to decide what a good explanation for it should look like.  In many higher-level sciences 
such as neurobiology the phenomena to be explained, the explanandum, are mechanisms that 
function as an underlying reason for the occurrence of the phenomenon.  By looking at the 
explananda as a mechanism, and by adopting certain normative rules as the ones that are 
pointed out above (1-5) it is possible to correctly identify causally relevant factors within a 
mechanism.  With this under- standing of the causal relevance in mechanistic explanations 
Craver lays the ground for a different kind of explanation, making out how explanations also 
can reveal constitutive relevance.  And even in the case of Leibniz and his principle of 
sufficient reason that we met above, it is not clear that the reason for the occurrence of an 
event have to be explained in a causal manner, and so there is also room for constitutive types 
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of explanations, as long as it can give sufficient reason for the occurrence of a given 
phenomenon or event. 
 
2.2 Constitutive Explanations 
 
So, from what is stated above there are two kinds of scientific explanations, and they 
might be of a causal or a constitutive character, depending of what kind of, and in what way a 
phenomenon demands an explanation.  A constitutive explanation, as opposed to a causal 
explanation is explanatory relevant in terms of explaining the underlying mechanism of the 
phenomenon.  The idea of the constitutive explanation is that  phenomena  in many cases can 
be explained without  making an appeal to the kind of temporal  structure with cause 
following effect through  time (appearing  after one another  in a space-time  diagram),  but  
the  difference between  the  two types of explanations  is unclear and easily confused as they 
are both  trying  to explain some- what  similar scientific problems.  The difference between 
the two ways of explaining scientific phenomena might be better understood by illustrating 
what the two have in common and where they separate in terms of giving different kind of 
explanations to different phenomena.  Firstly both of these models are aimed at making sense 
of, and explain the world and everything in it in a scientifically consistent way, they differ 
significantly in the way they address problems, and in what kind of things they explain. 
A causal explanation describes a temporal sequence with causes and effects following 
each other in a fixed order, from cause to effect in an asymmetric relationship, meaning that 
the effect can never explain the cause. We can very often see this as an historical account, 
where cause and effect follow each other through time to get us to the event we now observe. 
The cause need also be something that is necessary for the effect to occur.  A causal 
explanation as such will be an explanation of how one phenomenon works to change or create 
an effect, i.e.  How these two, the cause and the effect relate to one another.   A causal 
explanation  will in other  words describe the  behavior  of a mechanism,  stating  the  kinds  
of conditions  (the  cause)  that  are necessary  for the  effect.  For short one can say that the 
explanandum in a causal explanation, the object the causal explanation is to make sense of, is 
the relationship between cause and effect. Causal explanations (if they are successful) do 
seem like a good way to go about explaining the world, but often scientific explanations are 
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not only causal.  Many of the explanations we find in the natural sciences are based on the 
constitutive model of explanation, and such explanations are intrinsically different than the 
ones supported by causality.  Still some of these differences are unclear, and even amongst 
philosophers who are devoted to theories of explanation sometimes have difficulties with 
discriminating between the two (Ylikoski 2013).  It is therefore crucial to take a closer look 
the individual and shared characteristics to understand how the two are related and separated. 
The constitutive explanations, unlike causal ones are not intended upon explaining the 
behavior of a mechanism; rather its explanandum can be understood as causal capacities.  The 
causal capacities are different dispositions, tendencies etc.  Of an entity, that describes what 
would happen to the entity in any given causal setting.   A causal explanation  would then be 
one that  explains why the disposition are realized, while the  constitutive explanation  is 
describing how these dispositions  or capacities work, and what they are like. Unlike the 
causal explanation,  the constitutive model does not explain temporal sequences or how cause 
and effect are related to each other through  the  span  of time (as mentioned  above the  cause 
and  effect does not  occur on different points  in the  space-time  diagram),  rather  the  
phenomenon  that  is sup- ported by the constitutive explanation  is simultaneous to the 
constitutive mechanism. This simultaneity is apparent, or “caused” due to the explananda of 
constitutive explanations, which is the structure of the causal parts of a given mechanism.   
The constitutive explanation  is thus, as is the case with causality,  an asymmetric  relation, 
but  here the asymmetry  points  to how the constitutional system explain the causal capacities 
of this system, and not the other way around (the causal capacities do not constitute the causal 
parts  and their organization)  (Ylikoski 2013). 
The  relation  between  the  causal parts  of a mechanism  and  the  way these are 
constituted it is aimed at making sense of seems to give and impression of constitution as 
somehow building on causal relationships  within the mechanism, but the relevance of the  
explanations  are still different as they  essentially  aim at  explaining  different things.  Here 
are some tricks to understand how they differ, and the different kinds of questions they 
explain. 
The  normal  way to  separate  between  causal  and  constitutive explanations  is to 
distinguish  between  etiological and  constitutive explanations.   Where the causal 
explanation has the relationship between cause and effect as its explanandum, the constitutive 
explanations aim at explaining the causal capacity of a system (Ylikoski 
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2013). A given system (for example a neuronal structure in the brain) can have many and 
varying causal dispositions or possibilities that  can be triggered in the right sort of 
circumstances,  and  the  goal of the  constitutive  explanation  is to  make sense of the causal 
capacities (the  dispositions or properties  mentioned  above) and how they work as they  do 
to  make  out  the  overall structure of the  whole.   So even though there are many similarities 
between causal and constitutive explanations they differ clearly from each other in terms of 
the explananda, or what they are actually trying to explain, and the explanatory relevance of 
the two models have different dependencies in terms of what make them into adequate 
explanations.  To get a better grip of this it is necessary to understand what is meant by a 
causal capacity.  The notion of a causal capacity illustrates what could be exacted to happen to 
an entity if it were put in a given causal setting, or in other words what would happen to an 
entity in a certain triggering or enabling condition.  Background conditions such as 
temperature etc.  Also play a role here, but this is a question of pragmatic relevance and can 
be determined by empiric inquiry.    So the causal  capacities  of a  system  can  behave  in  
different ways according to the  causal setting,  and the  job of the  constitutive explanation  is 
to  explain  why,  and  in what  cases a causal  structure gives (rise  to)  certain  kinds of 
properties.   One of the  explanatory  models,  the  causal  one has  as its  object  to explain 
events, the behavior of entities to give a reason for how something can be the cause of the  
other,  while the other,  the constitutive explanation  wants  to make out and explain what the 
necessary properties  of a system (or even an individual  causal capacity)  should be in order  
to  produce  the  causal  event  or process.   To illustrate this  difference and  to  shed  some 
light  over the  way different  kinds  of explananda will make claims to different explanatory  
models, Ylikoski (2013) exemplifies three different ways to inquire about  the fragility of a 
glass.  First we can ask how a glass has become fragile (enough to break), we can ask what 
makes the glass fragile, and we can ask about why the glass broke.  Of these three questions 
the first and the third demands causal explanations.  They are inquiries about an historical 
process leading eventually to the fragility and breaking of a glass, and as such they fit in with 
the view that causality deals with processes and events.  The answers to questions should in 
other words describe the process that has led the glass to become fragile and break, with the 
latter question (3) describing the triggering event that actually caused the glass to break.   The 
second question on the other hand asks for a different kind of explanation.   When  asking 
about  what  makes the  glass fragile, the  point  is not  no gain an understanding of the 
historical process leading the glass to break, but rather what  intrinsic  qualities  makes the 
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glass prone to break in the first place.  The thing that needs answering in this question is what 
gives the glass the causal capacity to break, and such an explanation will be a constitutive 
one.  This  example,  given by Ylikoski (2013) demonstrates that  there is a difference 
between asking about  how an object  acquire  its dispositions  (here fragility)  and what  
makes it fragile, something that  depends on the properties  of its structure. 
The explanandum is, according to what  is stated  above the  thing  that  should be in 
focus when determining  what kind of explanation  will best answer the question, so a 
scientist  should always be careful and precise about  what  the explanandum of his theory  is, 
and  use the  right  sort  of explanans  accordingly.   So the relevance of an explanation 
depends on what kind/part of a phenomenon the scientist wants to explain and can be entailed 
by the way the scientific question is posed. In many cases both  types of explanations  will be 
relevant for the  sake of understanding the  whole behavior of a mechanism or system, but 
depending on what kind of question is asked, again only one type of explanation  might as 
well be sufficient to account for the problem under  investigation.   A constitutive explanation 
can for example be a necessary supplement to an etiological explanation by providing focus to 
the “wholeness” of the system by asking and explaining how a system has the capacity for a 
specific kind of behavior (Ylikoski 2013), or itself be sufficient when the phenomenon to be 
explained asks for how a system has the properties it has.  This is often the case in 
neuroscience where the individual behavior of an entity or individual is not generally the 
focus of the investigation.    In neuroscience, including the part that is interested in, and 
investigates consciousness, the point is often to gain a general understanding of how a 
structure can be responsible for and give rise to the phenomenon under investigation.  In 
relation to what  kind of explanation  would yield a better  understanding of consciousness, a 
constitutive explanation  might seem better  equipped to do the job. It could provide an 
explanation of what it takes of a system (the brain) to constitute, or realize conscious content.   
As this is important for how the Hard Problem of consciousness might one day be solved.  I 
will return to this statement later, after discussing how a constitutive model is built up, and 
also how this is important for the possibility of explaining consciousness. 
As stated above constitutive explanations give an understanding of how the parts in a 
system are constituted by explaining how the interaction and organization of the components 
and their activities  relate to the system as a whole (Craver  2007). The constitutive 
explanation  works by explaining the  structure and organization  of the causal components,  
and how these gives rise to a given phenomenon,  the relation between the causal parts  and 
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the constitutive explanation  is thus asymmetrical.  This means that  the  causal capacities  
themselves  does not  constitute its parts  and their structure and organization.  In other words 
the constitutive explanation  explains the what  in the  organization  and  structure of the  
causal  properties  is like in the  case of a given phenomenon,  and the  causal components  
and the  relation  between them does not  themselves  give a constitutive explanation.   This  
means that  the  explanation  works in a one-way direction,  with  constitutive explanations  
making  sense of the  causal relationship  between  the  components.   The constitutive 
explanation also describes a synchronous relationship, if there is a change in the basis of the 
structure that at the same time alters the causal capacities in the components there is no time 
laps between the two, they are not independent of each other and a change in one will lead to 
a change in the other, making “cause” and “effect” mutually dependent of each other 
(Ylikoski 2013). 
The relation between the components can be seen as the entities in a mechanism, and 
the way they function (and thus the functioning of a given mechanism) can be explained by a 
constitutive explanation.  As such the constitutive explanation  can be understood  as a 
relation  of dependence,  seeing as the causal capacities  of the whole depends on the 
structure, organization and activity of the parts, both the organization and  the  activity  of the  
parts  do in other  words have explanatory  relevance for the constitutive explanation.   Here 
see how the constitutive explanation  builds upon the causal  capacities  found in the  parts,  
and  how the  system  has it’s causal  capacities thanks  to the causal capacities of the parts.  
For short, the causal capacities make up and “build” the structure as a whole, and the role of 
the constitutive explanation is to explain the components, organization and activities that 
make up the structure of the complete mechanism.  The adequacy  of the constitutive 
explanation  stems from its ability  to explain the  organization  of the  parts  and how this  
leads to the  causal activities  that  make  up  the  whole of the  system.   But  in the  case of 
constitutive explanations,  as in the  causal  ones, difficulties about  determining  the  
explanatory relevance of a given part in the system are likely to occur . This is especially 
apparent in cases where only some aspects of a structure are taken as a necessary 
explanandum of a phenomenon.  In such cases problems of determining which of the parts 
relevant factors for the realization of the problem are should be accounted for. The fact that  
the structure of the  mechanism  under  investigation  might be realized by several causal 
capacities  creates  a redundancy  of explanatory relevant factors  for the  constitutive 
explanation,  but  according to Ylikoski (2013) this problem can be treated  much like the  
  
 
27 
 
problem  of alternative causes in the  case of causal explanations.   In such cases where more 
than one possible cause can lead to the same effect what is to be held as the actual cause is not 
always readily available.   When undertaking, for example, a thought experiment about 
possible causes of a given effect or event, there might be some problems linked to the 
determination of what is the actual cause in cases where several causes can yield the same 
effect. But in (natural) science, this is a question of empirical research, and the answer to what 
cause is actually the right one is often or always available through empirical experiments, and 
by looking more closely for the relevant explanatory factors.  In fact there are close 
similarities between the problems found in causal and constitutive explanations, and these 
problems can often be solved in similar ways as well. So both  the problems, the solutions and 
ultimately  also the things  they  want to  explain  can  all be similar  for the  causal  and  the  
constitutive explanations,  even though  the explanatory  relevance depends on different 
things. 
The question about how living beings comes to be conscious is posed best as an 
inquiry about what enables conscious experience.  The Hard Problem of conscious- ness thus  
demands  a constitutive explanation,  en explanation  that  can provide  an understanding of 
the underlying structure of consciousness and that  can give a better insight into  what  kind  
of properties  that  are necessary for conscious experience to occur. 
For several reasons, then, it does not seem to make sense to ask for a causal link to 
account for the relationship between the physical structures of the brain and the experiential 
contents of the mind.  More likely the link, and so the best explanation is to be found by help 
of a constitutive model, aiming to explain and make out what the physical structure of the 
brain (along with relevant background states)  must look like in order to give rise to 
qualitative consciousness.  If this is right it might imply that the right kind of explanation for 
consciousness is constitutive.  This  notion  is further supported  by the thing that  seems to be 
the core and the cause of the Hard Problem in philosophy of mind, the apparent difference in 
substance  between physical structures and  neuronal  signals and  the  way this  is 
experienced  in our  subjective consciousness. The metaphysical difficulty of making out and 
proving “logically” the necessity of a causal link between cause and effect is thus amplified 
by the substantial difference between the physical and subjective conscious entities.   In 
normal  science the remedy for the causal worry is empirical research and experimentation, 
but in the field of consciousness this is more difficult due to the many and complicated 
structures of the  brain  that  need to be better  understood  themselves in order to give a better 
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understanding of their causal relevance.  And this of course is topped by the seemingly 
insurmountable substantial differences between physicality and mind. 
If the phenomenon under investigation  turns  out to not entail a causal relation- ship, a 
causal explanation  of this  relation  might not  be the   best  way to gain a better  
understanding of the  problem.   If it turns  out  that  the  relationship  between the physical 
and the mental is better  explained by a constitutive type of explanation, as is implied by this 
chapter,  it would seem that  the kind of explanation  one should seek to close the  explanatory  
gap of the hard  problem is constitutive.  The solution to the problem of consciousness should 
thus try to find out what kind of properties, structure and organization is necessary on the 
physical level in order for consciousness to “happen”, rather than finding a temporal cause to 
effect solution. 
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3 Constitution and Consciousness 
 
As discussed  in  the  last  chapter,   the  aim  of constitutive explanations  is to offer an 
understanding of a given phenomenon by appealing to the organization  and structure of the  
parts  that  constitute  a phenomenon  or an event.   More accurately, constitutive explanations 
are a description of the processes that underlies and gives the premisses for the occurrence of 
the given phenomenon.   So instead of a causal explanation of why the phenomenon occurs 
we get a description that tells us what kind of properties are present, and how this is 
constitutional for the phenomenon or event.  As such the constitutive explanation offers an 
understanding of the underlying structure of the phenomenon of interest (Craver 2007). 
In philosophy and science of mind this type of explanation is seen as the way to go when it 
comes to finding an adequate explanation of consciousness. This is evident in the way 
cognitive science and philosophy of mind formulate theories of consciousness, where research  
first and  foremost  deals with,  and  tries  to find, a constitutive explanation  of consciousness 
(Craver  2007).  As we have seen it is difficult to expect, or even ask for causal links between 
physical indications of mind, and the felt experience of the conscious content, due to the 
apparent difference between physical substance and the abstractness
4
 of conscious experience.   
Examples  of this  kind of constitutive approach  in the  field of philosophy  of mind  is found 
in many  theories such as representational theories, functionalism  (Putnam 1967, Fodor 
1968),  identity theory  (Feigl 1958, Smart  1959) and  so on.  Although theories in areas such 
as these do not always make explicit claims of providing constitutive explanations, I will try 
to make it clear in what follows the kind of explanations found here are profoundly 
constitutive in their form.   But  as the  mystery  of consciousness has  not  yet  been solved, 
large differences can be found between the different theories of how conscious- ness might  
arise, and  accordingly what  should be seen as constitutional factors  for this. 
The mind/brain identity theory for example, is a form of materialism or physicalistic 
theory of mind.
5
   As the  name  of the  theory  indicates,  the  mind/body identity  theory  
says that  a state  of mind is identical  to a brain  state,  i.e. mind and brain  correspond  to 
each other,  and for all mental  states  there  are necessarily some brain  state  that  can be 
                                               
4 By abstract, or rather the phenomenal nature of the mind, I refer to the difficulty of making objective 
measurements of conscious experience. 
5 With a physicalistic theory of mind I refer to theories that support the notion that mental states can be reduced 
to physical states in the brain. 
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identified  with  it.   The  phenomenal  experience  of the  world,  our thoughts  and feelings, 
can thus  be explained  by appealing  to  physical  brain  states. To describe the  mental  state  
of interest,  a supporter  of the  physical mind/brain identity  theory would turn  to the states 
found in the brain  in order to give the appropriate answer as the  mental  state  is 
identified/identical with  this  physical  state.   In the physical mind/brain identity theory a 
constitutive explanation of consciousness would thus be focused on explaining the properties 
of the brain state that identifies the mental state.   A constitutive explanation will in this case 
depend upon a specific explanation of the brain and brain states, since this is what constitutes 
mental states.  Here identity  as it  is found in the  mind/brain identity  thesis  is understood  as 
a special case of constitution, where a constitutive explanation  of mental states  depends on 
an accurate  description  of the brain states  identical to the mental  states. 
Physicalism,  the  branch  of philosophy  of which the  kind  of physical  identity 
theory discussed above is a part equates mental states (mental content)  with a physical state 
or process, so that  there is nothing to be found out about the mental states over and  above 
what  can be known about  this  state  in physical terms.   In this case the two types of states 
are identical to each other.   There  is in other  words a strong correlation  between  mind  and  
body,  to  the  point where,  according  to  Armstrong (1968) all mental states can be seen as 
corresponding to a physical state which should be perceived as literally identical to it.  
According to Place (1945), one of the founders of brain/mind identity  theory,  “The  logical 
objections which might be raised to the statement ‘consciousness is a process in the  brain’  
are  no greater  than  the  logical objections which might be raised to the  statement ‘lightning 
is a motion  of electric charges” (Place 1945, p. 255). The statement might benefit from some 
moderation
6
, but it still indicates in a good way how supporters of the mind/brain identity 
theory logically conceive of consciousness and the relationship between consciousness and 
brain states. 
The identity theory is to some extent based upon the theory of neural correlates of 
consciousness. But instead of looking for some causal relation  that  binds the two together,  
or seeing consciousness as an epiphenomenal  byproduct of neural  activity as is the  case 
with  Cartesian  dualism  and  epiphenomenalism,  the  Identity  theory takes mental  activity  
to be the same as activity  in the brain.  To find out something about consciousness one will in 
other words have to study processes in the brain, as the expression of consciousness can be 
                                               
6 Feigl (1958) and  Smart  (1959) later  somewhat  moderated Place’s  statement, indicating  that lightning  and 
electric charge,  or sensation  and brain  state  for that matter might not have the same meaning,  yet they  still 
refer  to the same thing. 
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found here. The theory of mind/brain identity is a  good one,  as  it  gives a  concise answer  
to  what  consciousness is in  a  simple way without  treating qualia  as something  intrinsic  
and abstract.  Instead qualia is treated the same way as every other mental state, as a physical 
state in the brain. But  this  view has  proven  to  be problematic  and  has  been criticized  for 
being too rash by amongst  others  Chalmers  (1996) in his famous zombie thought 
experiment. With  the  zombie argument Chalmers  discusses the  metaphysical  
conceivability  of a person that  have all the  same physical states  as a normal,  phenomenally  
conscious being, yet the person lacks any experience of these physical states,  and so is 
without consciousness.  If two people could have all the same physical states, as well as the 
same behavioral reactions to sense input, with only one of them having any conscious 
experience of this, it implies that there is something more to consciousness or qualia than the 
physical states of the mind.  This argument have been disputed, as it is a thought experiment, 
and not empirically verifiable.  An opponent  might  argue that it is actually  not possible to 
imagine such a person,  and  that  if the  brain  states  of the  “zombie” are the  same as the  
normal  persons, then  this  implies that  there  also are corresponding  mental  states,  and this  
person can in fact not be an unconscious zombie. 
3.1 The Problem of Multiple Realizability 
 
When mental states are understood to be identical with brain states this also makes the 
way for the advantage of dealing with the problem of dualism in a straight- forward way, as it 
skips the whole problem by identifying consciousness with specific states in the brain.   When  
there  is no contradiction between  mind and  brain  there is no room for dualism,  as the  two, 
the  mental  and  the  physical,  are just  different expressions of the same thing.  From this it 
is easy to see how the mind/brain identity theory is a theory under the physicalism parole, as 
mental states can be explained by the states found in the brain.   But the theory of mind/brain 
identity and the position of taking consciousness as a purely physical instance in the way it is 
done here is somewhat problematic according to some philosophers.  One of the main 
objections to the theory was presented  by Hilary Putnam (1967), he stressed the fact that  if 
mind and brain are to be understood  as the same thing, and that  the brain state  (and thus the 
mental  state)  is characterized  by being physically unique, only creatures  in this specific 
physical state  will have the corresponding mental state.  This will exclude all creatures that 
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are not in the given physical state from having any mental states.  This definition might prove 
to be too narrow, as it is fully possible to imagine that mental states can occur without such a 
specific physiological and chemical structure. In fact it is not really certain  that  all human  
beings are in the exact same physical-chemical stats  when they  experience a sensation  as for 
example pain,  so the  identity  theory that  states  that  there is a highly specific physical state  
for every mental  state  might be too forceful. This has been thoroughly discussed in William 
Bechtel and Jennifer Mundale in their 1997 paper “Multiple Realizability Revisited”. 
The critique of the mind/brain identity theory as it is put forth here by Putnam can also 
be used as an argument for functionalism and the functional understanding of how mind (and 
maybe also qualia) is constituted. One of the arguments  for functionalism  are based  just  on 
the  hunch  Putnam describes here, that  there  might  be no “equal” brain states,  and thereby  
no equal mental content.  Instead of identifying mental  states  with  physical  brain  states,  he 
proposes that  functional  states,  as an expression of the causal relationship  between sensory 
input,  other mental  states  and behavioral  output are what identifies and constitutes a 
specific mental state. 
An argument as to why the explanation Putnam gives for his dissatisfaction with the 
physicalism of the identity theory might be to narrow is according to Bechtel and Mundale 
(1997) the way philosophers of mind tend to describe brain states.  According to their 1997 
article “Multiple Realizability Revisited” the normal way of describing a brain state differ 
substantially from how the same phenomenon is described by cognitive scientists.   The 
difference lies in the definition, with philosophers  (at  least in many cases) referring to a 
brain state as the chemical-physical state of the brain at a given time,  in the same way 
Putnam does in the example noted  above.  Scientists who work on the brain has on the other 
hand traditionally not been concerned about detecting  and  identifying  “brain  states”  (as  
these  are  extremely  fine grained,  and difficult to detect  or even possible to use as grounds 
for relevant information  (Bechtel & Mundale 1997)) the task of the scientist  has rather  been 
to find out which area of the brain can be connected to certain  mental  states. 
This kind of neuro-anatomical brain mapping, has been performed by scientists at least 
since the 19th century,  and the project has largely been focused upon finding which areas of 
the brain are associated with given mental  states  such as for example hearing and memory, 
with a special focus on the study of vision. In this way cognitive scientists are in good hopes 
of finding neural (or at least area specific) correlates of consciousness. One of the arguments  
of Bechtel and Mundale is thus that  it is possible to find some sort  of identity  between  
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mental  states  and brain  states,  here in term of activity  in a certain  area of the  brain.   As 
research in this  area progress one can imagine the  mapping  of the  brain  to getting  more 
and  more specific in relation  to mental  states,  making a finely grained discrimination  of a 
brain  state  more likely to be found. 
This relates closely to what Bechtel and Mundale see as the primary error done by 
philosophers in relation to multiple realizations, and the reason for why it is held by many as a 
viable possibility.  The two scientists insists that  the possibility of multiple realization  
depends  on philosophers  tending  to have an imbalance  in terms  of how finely grained 
mental states  and brain states  are taken to be in relation to each other. Often brain states  are 
taken  as more finely grained than the mental  states,  meaning that  philosophers  are looking 
for very small and  demarcated brain  states  to  cover mental states  that  are actually  more 
general.  In other words they might imagine and look for very small and finely grained brain 
states to be necessary in order to identify wide mental states such as hunger or pain.  This 
imbalance is an error in terms of how the  brain  functions  empirically,  and to get a clearer 
picture  of how brain  and mind relates  to each other  physical and mental  states  should be 
kept  as having the  same “grain size” when they are compared with each other. 
Bechtel and  Mundale  stress  the  importance  of keeping the  size of the  brain states  
on  a  par  with  the  mental  states  because  this  lends  support  to  their  main argument,  that  
multiple  realizability  if it turns  out that  the same areas of the brain are responsible for the 
same mental states  between species (Bechtel &Mundale 1997). The point is that  cognitive 
research on brain  mapping  shows that  some areas of the brain  can  be linked  to  certain  
mental  states,  and  that  these  correlations  hold  for several species.  The same brain area 
can in other words be recognized across both individuals and different species.  As the  
mental  states  become more finely grained they will again relate to smaller areas of the brain, 
making more finely grained mental states  dependent  on more specific parts  of the  brain  all 
the  way down to chemical and  molecular  structures.  A typical argument from the  side of 
the  supporters  of multiple  realizability  is that  there  can  be no specific brain  states  that  
correspond to a given mental  state  due to lack of functional  evidence that  links the brain  
state to  the  mental  state.   But  if this  is due to  the  imbalance  of the  grain  size used to 
describe the  two this  might serve as a reason  for why multiple  realizability  on the physical 
level is impossible as long as the neuroscientists can identify at least coarse grained brain and 
mental  states  with each other.  According to Bechtel and Mundale (1997), the only reason 
why it is sometimes difficult to find the appropriate relation between a mental state  and a 
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brain state  is that  the division one is operating  in is to coarsely grained,  and all that  is 
needed to find the desired relation  is to make both the  mental  and the  physical state  
specific enough.  This might seem difficult at the present time, but if neuroscience and work 
on brain mapping keep evolving it might be conceivable that even the smallest differences in 
neural states can be detected.  If no such corresponding  brain  states  (that correlates  to given 
mental  states)  can be found between  species, the  reason probably  is, if one follows Bechtel  
and Mundale, that  there  really are no corresponding  mental  states  between  the  two.  Two 
clearly different  species such as a cow and  a human  being can probably  share  the  mental 
state  of being hungry,  and as such one would expect to find some similarity  between the 
brain  states  of the cow and the human  being, for example in the form of neural activity in 
the same area of the brain.  But at a more finely grained level there is really no knowing 
whether brain states can be common for different species, and if not, the individuals of the 
different species will not share the same mental states either.  This is no surprise, and should 
not be seen as a problem according to Bechtel and Mundale, as different species will probably 
have different dispositions for how to perceive and behave in the world, and if there is no 
equality between the brain states of different species, there is probably no point in expecting 
to find equal mental states. 
The possibility of multiple realizations should thus not be expected from neuro- 
scientific evidence, even though it seems intuitively plausible from the functionalist point of 
view. The error committed  by the philosopher of mind is to not adequately differentiate  
between mental  states  and brain  states,  taking  it for granted  that fine grained  brain  states  
can  correspond  to  the  more covering mental  states.    In other words psychological 
functional states are not multiple realizable on the physical level according to modern 
neuroscience, a scientific branch that remain hopeful of finding neural correlates of 
consciousness. It is on the other hand not in Bechtel and Mundales (1997) to disprove 
functionalism as an overall theory, they merely wish to point out the difficulty that should be 
associated with multiple realization between the physical and the mental level. From the 
functional level there is still, on the other hand, room for multiple realizability of mental 
states, and as such the functional states should be seen as important pointers to the kind of 
mental state that is apparent in the subject under research in order for a corresponding brain 
state/area to be detected. 
Early neurobiological research on brain mapping was done by experiments and studies 
of animal brains, which later was generalized to also account for the human brain (Bechtel 
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and Mundale 1997). This kind of generalization  might seem problematic, but scientific 
research on the area shows that  basic neural mechanisms seem are similar in all animals, and 
such studies has indeed proven to give a better  understanding of the  human  brain  
(Sylwester  1995).  Research on the human brain and brain mapping has also been done with 
lesion studies on human beings who have acquired brain damage, and in more recent times 
brain mapping on humans has been studied with brain scanning such as PET, MRI and fMRI. 
With these methods a map of the human  brain  able to show activity  in somewhat  specific 
and  separated  pats  of the brain  is possible to make,  and  this  can again be used as evidence 
for a correlation between physical and mental  states. 
The thing that explains consciousness according to the mind/brain identity theory is 
the physical and chemical structure of the brain, so what constitutes conscious- ness here is 
the physique of the brain.   But  as Bechtel and Mundale  (1997) implies in their  article,  even 
if multiple  realizability  is wrong, (possibly making mind/brain identity  theory seem like the 
better  option when it comes to plausible explanation  of mental  states)  it seems to be no real 
hinder  for the  notion  that  other  theories such as functionalism  are significant for how to 
explain mind. 
 
3.2 Functionalism 
 
As mentioned  above,  functionalism
7
 ,  unlike the physicalistic  identity  theory,  does 
not  take  the  physical or chemical structure of the brain  as the  basic constitution of 
consciousness, rather  the  identity,  or constitution of consciousness should  be looked for in 
the  way mental  states  function.   Instead of looking at  what  kind of neuronal  structure or 
brain  state  corresponds  to a given mental  state,  the  functionalist  looks at  what  kind of 
role the  mental  state  plays in the system of which it is a part.   The function of a mental state 
can be for example to utter sounds and in other ways show signs of discomfort when a subject 
is in pain. An illustration of this can be made by a comparison with a biological concept, for 
example a kidney, where the function of a kidney is determined by, amongst others, its ability 
to filtrate blood, and not by its physical features.  The same goes for the notion mental states, 
                                               
7 I later distinguish between what McLaughlin has called Role-functionalism and Role filler-functionalism 
(McLaughlin 2006), and the way functionalism is described right here can possibly be said to only apply to 
Role-functionalism. 
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it is determined by its function rather than physical features in the brain, when following the 
functionalist view on consciousness and mental states. 
Still there are two separate ways mental states can be identified within functionalist 
theories. A separation goes between role-functionalism and what McLaughlin (2006) called 
filler or role filler-functionalism. When deciding how to identify a mental  state,  some 
functionalist  thinkers  refer to the  higher level property  of the  causal relation  between 
input,  output and other  mental  states.   McLaughlin calls this role-functionalism, because 
the functional state can be understood as playing the role of the mental state.  Here the mental 
state is identical to the functional state itself. The other way for functionalism  to describe the 
nature of mental states  is by viewing the functional property  as a  descriptive  term,  a  
definite  description  for the  lower level property realize these functional  states.   Here the 
lower-level or physical property that gives rise to the functional state is seen as playing the 
role of, or realizing the functional state.   The theory  of role filler functionalism  is thus  a 
reductionist  theory,  and have close links to physicalistic  identity  theory,  but  differs by 
using functional  states  as an intermediary factor  in the  description  of mental  states.   In 
accordance  with  the Bechtel and Mundale  (1997) theory,  the physically  reductive  role 
filler-functionalism  should not  be seen as multiple  realizable,  but  if the  reference to 
physical states  is avoided in the  description  of mental  states,  as is the  case with  role 
functionalism,  multiple realizability  is still a possibility. 
Functionalism derives, and lends some support  from several philosophical and 
psychological branches,  such as behaviorism and analytic  philosophy, and was partly 
constructed as an  argument against  the  rigid  rules  for the  constitution of mental states  
found in the identity  theory,  by one of the functionalist  pioneers H. Putnam. As mentioned  
above Putnam understood  the  identity  theory  as unable to suffice as a plausible  theory  of 
mind,  as it did not  allow for mental  states  in anything  other than  physically (and 
chemically) identical structures possibly only the human  brain. As this position does not 
seem to cover all the ways we can imagine mental states to manifest themselves, Putnam 
(1967) understood the theory as giving evidence for the multiple realizability of mental states.  
A different theory for identifying and describing the nature of consciousness was thus needed. 
In role functionalism multiple realization is a possibility due to the fact that consciousness or 
mental states are equal to their functions, the identification of a given mental state depends 
solely upon its individual relation to other mental states, along with sense input and 
behavioral output. In other words the physical structure in which these relations form is not 
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essential to what the mental state is like.  One might say that  functionalism  is a 
computational model of consciousness where only the software is constitutional for the 
mental states,  and the hardware is optional as long as its structure are able to provide the right 
functions.  A brain made out of silicone might function just as well as a brain maid of human 
cells, 
 As long as it provides the same sort of functions.   As the example with the kidney 
illustrates, it just does not matter what kind of matter an organ (or other entity) is made of, as 
long as it is sufficient for the thing to fulfill its task, or rather function in a given way. In role 
filler functionalism on the other hand, there is room for the physical states of the brain, as 
these are seen as the realizers of the functional states.  As long as it is a point for 
functionalism to provide an explanation for the occurrence of mental states, where there is 
room for the possibility of somewhat different functional states giving rise to more or less the 
same mental experience, and if Bechtel and Mundales (1997) argument against the possibility 
of multiple realizability from a physical level is correct, the role functionalism might provide 
a better option for how functionalism should be understood. 
In addition  to these two ways of understanding the role of functional states  and their  
relation  to  mental  states,  functionalism  has  several  different  varieties,  where the  
functions  of mental  states  are defined in different ways.  According to amongst others 
Putnam (1967), the mind can be understood roughly as a machine which uses input and the 
dispositions found in the machinery to produce output.  This output might translate into the 
function of the machine, in the same way as mental states can be seen as functions of the 
causal relations mentioned above.  This model loosely resembles the psychological theory of 
behaviorism, as it focuses mainly on the output of the “machine”/brain as the function of the 
mental state.  Another sort of theory is found in psycho-functionalism (Fodor 1968), which 
takes empirically available data about human psychology, often cognitive psychology as a 
basis for how mental states “works”.  Psycho-functionalism  use the methodology  of the  
psychological theory  to determine  the  function  of the  mental  states,  and by using 
framework,  it makes the scientific, cognitive structure fundamental for the function of the 
mental  states. 
Other  variations  of functionalism  also exist
8
, but  for my  purpose  here  it  is enough 
to make out that  within a functionalistic  framework there are several ways to understand 
how the functional  states  of the mental  states  should best be described. The constitutive 
                                               
8 See for example  Kim (1989), Fodor  (1968) and Kripke  (1980) 
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explanation of mental states will thus vary between the different theories. Most of the 
functionalist  theories does however have some common problems, amongst  others  the  
theories  are often constructed in such a way that  they  exclude individuals  who lack certain  
functions  from having the  corresponding  mental  state. Something,  or someone who for 
example does not have the given functional  expression of for example the mental  state  of 
being in pain,  is seen as to lack this mental state  on a whole (Block 1980), since a functional 
description  is based upon functional expressions,  it  is not  able to  provide  an  explanation  
for mental  states  where such expressions are lacking. This is damaging to our notion that we 
can understand and share mental states, and it is thus a problem for functionalism because the 
theory in this case does not give a sufficient explanation of how mental states can be 
understood and identified. 
More importantly (for the purpose here), and more damaging to functionalism, is the 
problem of qualia. This problem has proven to be especially difficult, and even though 
functionalism has more problems (as seen above), it seems like none of these has been as 
difficult to refute as the problem of qualia.  There are here several worries, and Chalmers’ 
problem of absent qualia has already been presented. Another serious critique of 
functionalism takes up the problem of inverted qualia, and is largely connected to work done 
by Ned Block (1980).  The notion of inverted  qualia express the  worry that  it  might be 
possible for some individuals  to  have  an  experience  of something that  is opposite to how 
other people experience the same thing, or maybe even opposite to how the person itself have 
experienced the same thing at an earlier time.   The most popular way of making this 
argument is by imagining an inverted color spectrum.  The inverted spectrum thought 
experiment is the hypothesis or the thought experiment that you can imagine other people to 
see colors differently than you do, for example we could perceive of a person where every 
color has been swapped out by its complementary color. This means that the person in 
question sees yellow as blue, green as red and so on. The notion is not a new one, and many 
people, even children often wonder whether other people see colors the same way they do.  
The fact is that we in many cases actually don’t!  More often than not color will appear in a 
more or less different shade of the same color from person to person, with the difference 
growing with quantity of different (biological) factors (Block 2006). 
In his argument Block imagines that  the  wires in the  visual system  has been crossed, 
so that  the connection from a cone that  detects  red light are transferred to a part  of the  
brain  that  gives the  mental  image of green,  either  all the  way from infancy,  or as the  
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consequence of an operation  performed  later  in life.  In this case the person with the 
“crossed wires” would perceive differently of colors in relation to people with a “normal” 
color perception.   But how could anyone know this to be a fact?   In the  case were the  
person with  the  inverted  spectrum  has undergone  an operation  the  person  could probably  
give some sort  of expression  of perceiving  as red today  the things which appeared  green 
yesterday.  The person could point to the grass and tell us that it now looks to have the color 
of a ripe strawberry, at the same time as knowing that this was not the case yesterday, when it 
was green (we can’t actually know what green was like to this person earlier, maybe it is first 
now that the colors actually look “normal”, the way they look to me?).  A person that,  on the 
other hand is borne with an inverted  spectrum  would probably  not be so inclined as to see 
that  there is anything  wrong or abnormal  with the way he perceives the color of grass.  He 
or she would probably refer to the grass as having the color green, even if it would look red to 
us if we could take a look inside his head.  Block stresses the point that in such a case nobody 
really has the right to say that the way he or she experience color is the right way, as there is 
no clear reference or standard of which this can be measured.   If the  way other  people 
experience  a color is hidden  to  us due to the  impossibility  of communicating  the  
difference between  the  two, there  is really no way of knowing who is right about  what  the  
actual  color of a thing  looks like.
9
 .  Additionally we might imagine an experiment where a 
person putts on a pair of goggles that inverts the color spectrum so that every color looks like 
its opposite (complimentary color) when they are put on.   In a similar experiment done with 
glasses that makes the world seem like it is upside down, George M. Stratton (1896) found 
that after wearing the glasses continuously for several days his vision gradually adapted, and 
turned the image over so that the world again appeared the right way up.  When he then 
removed the “upside down” goggles, the world again seemed to be turned upside down, even 
though it now actually was turned the right way, making him disoriented once again.   In  this 
case the  brain  of the  person  undergoing  the experiment  (Stratton), adapted  to seeing the  
world upside  down by reconstructing the image to look like it normally would, and as in the 
case of the inverted  spectrum rewiring, after  adaption  both  the functional  and the mental  
states  are the same as before the goggles were put on, even though the image that  actually  
hits the eyes has been reversed. 
                                               
9Here the look of the color refers to the way it is experienced of a given individual.  If color is instead described 
in physical terms as light with different wavelengths, a color is determinable in reference to its specific 
wavelength.   What kind experience this yields in different individuals is a different question, and is what I 
discussed here.  
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The hypothesis of inverted spectrum is an argument against functionalism.  The key 
here lies in Block’s attempt to show that it is impossible to discover the functional difference 
between an inverted and a normal color spectrum.    If it  is possible to invert  the  color 
spectrum  in a human  being,  so that  its  reversed  in relation  to  another  without  there  
being any  detectible  functional  difference between  the  states, functionalism  cannot explain 
the difference between the two states. 
This problem shows up due to the  fact that  the  purely relational  character  of the  
functional  states  makes it  impossible to determine  what  kind of experience an individual  
actually  has in connection to his mental  states,  as long as the  functional expression is the  
same, all one can be certain  about  is that  the  mental  state  is the same.   In  other  words  it  
is here  possible to  imagine  someone having  an  inverted color spectrum,  where the 
functional expressions correlates with the opposite colors of what is “normal”, making the 
actual experience or qualia an unavailable factor for the functionalist theory.  This also opens 
up for the notion of absent qualia, supporting the notion that there might exist individuals 
without experiential content, who actually lack the qualitative portion of mental states.   This 
notion  points  to a deep problem for functionalism  and  its  relation  to  qualia,  because  
even though  functionalism  is happy  to  explain  mental  states  in terms  of the  functional  
states,  these  states  are characterized  by the extrinsic relationship between perceptive input, 
output and other (causally relevant)  mental  states  without  making an appeal to the felt 
quality  of the intrinsic these mental states.  In other words functionalism are only in the 
business of explaining the extrinsic properties  of mental  states,  and shows little or no 
interest  in the intrinsic properties of qualia.  A reaction to this was proposed by John 
Haugeland (1978),  who suggested  that  the  theory  of functionalism  can  be narrowed  
down to only serve as an explanation  for mental  states  that  lacks qualitative content,  
making qualia  absent  from the  functionalistic  explanation.    This  again  relates  to  the  
fact that  even though every functional  state  is equal to those found in a “normal” human 
being, there  is still no guarantee  that  there  is a qualitative experience connected  to it.  Ned 
Block (1980) illustrates  this by imagining people substituting as the  neural structure of the  
brain,  duplicating  its functional  organization  by messaging sensory inputs  from an 
artificial  body, and sending messages between  each other  much like a normal brain  would 
do.  This could yield functional  states  equal to those found in the normal brain, but it seems 
that  it would not give rise to any form of experienced qualia over and above the qualitative 
experience of the individuals participating in the experiment.  This moment of critique will be 
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investigated further in the next chapter Here I argue that there might be a way for functional 
states to include this qualitative aspect, if we supplement functionalism with a 
phenomenological understanding of how consciousness is constituted. 
These arguments  are damaging  to the  functionalism  in as much  as one takes qualia  
to  be  a  real  thing.    This  seems to  be  the  attitude of most  scientists  and philosophers  of 
mind,  as it is natural to take  the  way we “feel” and experience our conscious content  to be 
real.   Still there  are those  who are inclined to throw  away these kinds of felt qualities  and 
experiences all together  in order to avoid problems like those mentioned  above (along with 
several others),  mainly eliminitavist  theories of consciousness (see Dennett  1978, 1988 and 
Churchland 1981).  According to this kind of theory people is in a way understood to be 
“zombie like”, as there is actually no experiential content associated with the neural activity 
of the brain. 
The “zombie-argument” (Chalmers 1996), that previously was used as an argument 
against identity theory is also used as an argument against role filler functionalism. The 
problem with the role filler type of functionalism  is that  it identifies functional states  with 
physical states,  and physicalism gives rise to the possibility of the existence of philosophical 
zombies of the type mentioned  in the eliminitavist  theory, human  beings who live and have 
physical and functional  states  without  qualitative and experiential  counterparts. The zombie 
possibility seems highly unsatisfactory if we want to hang on to the notion that human beings 
are generally conscious and able to experience the contents of our mental lives (For details see 
Chalmers 2002). Levine (2001) later proposed that the conceivability of such zombies might 
not make functionalism and physicalism false theories, as physical and functional states still 
might serve as necessary constitution for consciousness.  In relation to qualia however the 
theories seem to open up for the explanatory gap, as they do not sufficiently explain how the 
qualitative and experiential factors of consciousness arise from such physical and functional 
states. 
The Hard Problem can in other words not be solved by describing mental states as 
purely physical or functional states.  Both the mind/brain identity theory and role filler-
functionalism can be described as reductive theories, because consciousness is perceived as 
something that can be reduced to physical states in the brain. Role-functionalism is on the 
other hand not a reductive theory in this sense, as it does not identify mental states with the 
states found in the brain. So there is in other words a distinct difference between Role filler 
and role-functionalism, as one of them reduce mental states to physical states in the brain and 
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takes the functional states as a denoting factor of this relation, while the other actually identify 
mental states with these functional states. But it might also be possible to take role-
functionalism as a sort of reductive theory. This is because it holds that mental states can be 
described in terms of, or as, something else, namely the functional states. In eliminitavist 
theories on the other hand, the existence of consciousness is denied  on a  whole,  and  if this  
notion  seems to be unsustainable (as it  does to  many)  it  is necessary to  look a bit  further  
in order  to  find a viable explanation  to consciousness. This is the goal of the physicalistic 
mind/brain identity theory,  but this theory also seem to be insufficient as it does not provide a 
necessary explanation  for the  qualitative aspect  of mental  states,  as having a certain  
physical state  does not  entail  having  conscious experience.   The notion of qualia are more 
or less excluded from the discussion in the physicalistic identity theory, neither is it logically 
implied.  Functionalism ends up in much the same way, as it does not offer an explanation for 
the intrinsic character of qualitative experience.  In the case of inverted spectrum it is not even 
clear that the theory offers a sufficient explanation to any mental states.  This implies that 
there is still some way to go before the occurrence of the qualitative aspect of mental states 
can be thoroughly explained and understood. Further discussion is needed about what 
constitutes a mental state in order to come closer to a conclusion.  If, as it seems here there are 
many ways to understand the constitution of consciousness, and disagreement between   
different theories about what the constitution of consciousness is, and how it is constituted, a 
better understanding of consciousness might be needed.  In what follows I will take a look at 
how a phenomenological perspective on consciousness might open up for a deeper 
understanding of what consciousness really is, along with an alternative view on how 
consciousness can be explained in constitutional terms.  
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4 A Phenomenological Understanding 
of Consciousness 
 
In order to give a constitutive explanation of consciousness, it is necessary to have a full 
understanding of the phenomenon of the explanation,   namely consciousness itself.   In  this  
paper  I have  referred  to  consciousness as what  Nagel (1974) called qualia, the inert,  
subjective  experience following mental  states.   But an even clearer description of how 
consciousness should be understood is to be found in Husserlian phenomenology.  The theory 
he proposes is also ready to deal with the relationship between consciousness and the outside 
world, something that has been one of the main issues in the philosophy of both Nagel and 
Chalmers.  The mission of Husserl’s phenomenology is to analyze the structure and meaning 
of human psychological concepts in order to get a clearer understanding of the nature of 
consciousness, and how we are able to perceive the world.  The project  aims at disclosing 
what  he describes as “pure consciousness”, or what  is left when one abstracts away from, 
and excludes (thoughts about)  the world and self. The point is to perform a 
phenomenological reduction, where the world is bracketed
10
 in order for conscious awareness 
to appear on its own (Husserl 2012). As such, consciousness and the way it is directed at the 
world is in itself open for research in a different manner than what is the case in traditional 
analytic philosophy and cognitive research.   This  is because  the  phenomenological 
reduction  lets  consciousness,  instead  of the  physical  word be the  phenomenon  of 
research and interest,  as the  world “in itself” is taken  out  of the  discussion.  
 In the Husserlian  way of investigating  consciousness, the  conscious experience 
itself is the starting  point for the evaluation,  and the way of doing research is more or less 
turned around  in relation  to the  method  of analytic  philosophy  and classical neuroscience. 
In a way the tables have been turned, so where conventional philosophy of mind talks about 
what a plausible constitution for consciousness might be, phenomenology has the habit of 
asking what the constitution of the conscious mind might be like in order for us to experience 
the world as we do.  
The phenomenological way of perceiving consciousness and its relation to the world 
has also been adopted and developed by other thinkers, mostly belonging to the continental 
                                               
10 The Phenomenological reduction:  By performing an epoche, the world is “bracketed” so that the focus can 
stay on how the world is constituted in our minds. 
44 
 
tradition, such as Heidegger (2007), Sartre (1957) and Merleau-Ponty (2012). In recent times 
the phenomenological tradition has been further  developed by philosophers  such as Shaun  
Gallagher and Dan Zahavi (2008), and Evan Thompson,  Luiz Pessoa and Alva Nöe (1999), 
with the mission of giving a better  understanding of how consciousness should be perceived 
in  philosophy of mind. 
In traditional analytic philosophy of mind we meet several different theories of how 
consciousness is constituted.  Different explanations  of consciousness are  thus available,  but  
as we saw in the  last  chapter,  all of these are still open for critique, and  there  are some 
profound  problems  associated  with  more or less all of them  if we want to explain the Hard 
Problem,  while still using description  of consciousness as it is stated  by Nagel (1974) and  
Chalmers  (1995).  The  main  objection  to both  physicalistic  (reductionist) theories  and,  to 
some extent  functionalism,  is that  they do not  provide adequate  evidence for, or even an 
understanding of the  experiential or qualitative aspect  of mental  states.   In  phenomenology  
on the  other  hand,  the conscious or experiential  part  of mental  states  is where any theory  
seeking to explain consciousness should start  out, and in order to give an adequate  
explanation  it is necessary to first understand what consciousness is. Because of this 
difference in terminology and the way consciousness is understood,  it  is interesting  to  look 
at  how the  two  methods or traditions fit together,  and whether  one can be used to 
supplement  the  other  in order to gain a more coherent  and wider reaching  explanation  of 
consciousness.   
In this chapter  I am going to take a closer look at the phenomenologically inspired 
enacted  theory (fronted  especially by Alva Nöe (2009)), and how this somewhat  opposite  
view on what  is explanatory  relevant  in the  case of consciousness might  be used  to  
supplement  analytic  philosophy  of mind.   Here I will mostly concentrate on functionalism 
as it is explained in the previous chapter, and look at whether the phenomenological 
understanding of consciousness can be used to supplement this functionalistic effort to answer 
the Hard Problem.  As discussed in the earlier, functionalism is unable to account for the 
experiential aspect of consciousness because the functional states that identify the mental 
states do not express these intrinsic qualities.  But with a supplement given by the 
phenomenological description of consciousness, it is possible to describe the functional states 
as also expressing the subjective experience of consciousness.   This  “new” description  of 
mental  states  can  hopefully,  in turn, be used to supplement functionalism  by providing an 
objective or extrinsic  referent to experiential  mental  states.   As proposed  by Haugeland  
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(1978), there  might  be a job for someone else than  functionalism  to explain the experienced 
quality  of mental states,  and if phenomenology  can provide any kind of insight on this  area,  
the  two theories might supplement each other  nicely, and as such, give a plausible 
explanation of qualia and the mind/body problem.  An example of this is found in the work 
of, amongst others, the Italian neuro-scientist Giulio Tononi (2000).  In his information 
integration theory Tononi proposes that a science of consciousness must be based on a 
fundamental understanding of what consciousness is, and what it does. The insight into what 
consciousness is like is gained through phenomenological investigation of the intentional 
character of the mind in relation to the world. The project is aimed at providing a system for 
the understanding of phenomenal consciousness through mathematization, which in turn 
enables neuroscientists to identify necessary components in the brain.  The project  bear some 
methodological similarities  to the earlier developments  of the  Canberra  plan,  based on the  
work by amongst  others  Lewis (1970), Armstrong  (1968) and Jackson  (1998).  The 
similarity between the two is the effort to ground a neuro-scientific explanation of the mind 
on an intuitive understanding of consciousness, similar to that of phenomenology.  The 
project aims at disclosing the a priori structure of thought we have when we engage with the 
world.  The point of the analysis is to map out what is required in order for experiential 
consciousness to be realized.   
The philosophical direction taken by the Canberra  Plan and the thinkers who support  
it is that  the  first  task  of a philosophical  project  is to  provide  this kind of a priori  
analysis,  rather  than  to make up synthetic  theories  about  how the (physical)  world should 
be apprehended.  In this way the theory is focused on finding/analyzing the a priori categories 
people use in their everyday thought of the world and mind.  The point is to undertake such an 
analysis in order to make clear the kind of structures that are applied when we (conscious 
beings) relate to the world, and this again can be helpful in terms of making out how the 
world is categorized in “normal”, folk-psychological thinking.   Further, the kind of insight 
given through the a priori analysis should lead to a better foundation for making synthetic 
theories about the constitution of the world (and mind).  The project  can be compared to, and 
as such give some support  to the  functionalist  role-filler theory,  because it points  out  the  a 
priori categories of human  thought. The understanding of these categories is used to 
structuralize and make sense of the world in order to determine how consciousness should be 
understood and explained in order for these categories to be realized.  This is similar to what 
role filler-functionalism does when it identifies mental states for the sake of finding the 
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underlying and realizing physical states.   Both theories make a point out of the necessity of 
being able to clearly describe the explanandum in order to make a thorough explanation of the 
phenomena of interest, and this is in line with the phenomenological way of accounting for 
consciousness. 
Part   of the  reason  why functionalism  does not  by  itself  provide  a  complete 
explanation  of experiential  consciousness was discussed in the previous chapter.   An 
important point being that functionalism  does not  extend  the  discussion of mental states  to  
include  experience  or qualia  (Livingston  2005).  This probably has something to do with 
the  fact that  role functionalism  lets psychological states  stand  as constitutional for the  
appearance  of consciousness,  in order  to  stay  on good terms  with  the  natural sciences 
and empirical research. But to describe mental states in terms of the relationship between 
psychological states such as behavior and sensory input does not necessarily grasp the 
experiential aspect of consciousness. By appealing to the extrinsic qualities described by 
classical psychology, functionalism keeps within the framework of cognitive science and 
physicalism, and meets problems as these theories do when it comes to explaining the 
intrinsic character of qualia.  As illustrated with objections stated  by Ned Block (1980)  in  
the  last  chapter,   functionalism  is able  to  explain  (or  give grounds  for) mental states,  by 
appealing to the relation between psychological states and behavior, but  the problem is that  
neither  psychological states  nor behavior express subjective experience.    
This is what is reflected in Blocks critique in the inverted spectrum hypothesis.  So, 
even though functionalism provides a good framework for how mental states can be 
understood, by showing how these mental states can be identified with functional states, this 
is not enough to provide for an explanation of the experiential consciousness. In other words 
the theory fails to provide an adequate explanation of the Hard Problem.  Does this leave an 
opening for phenomenology and the understanding of consciousness provided for here? There 
certainly seem to be some good evidence for thinking that functionalism and phenomenology 
have something in common.  They both distance themselves from a pure physicalistic 
reduction of the mind
11
, and they both appeal to logical analysis as a method for describing 
mental states.  As such both are less close to empirical methods of scientific research than a 
functionalist might like to admit.  But this is not necessarily a devastating problem for 
functionalism, as it depends on how the constitution of consciousness is understood. 
                                               
11 At least  this  is the  case for both  phenomenology  and  what  I in the  previous  chapters referred to as role-
functionalism. Role-filler functionalism is on the other hand more in line with a physical reduction of mental 
state. 
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One of the  goals for many  physicalistic  reductive  theories  of mind  is to  find neural  
correlates  of consciousness in order to show that  mental  states  are equal to, or at least 
dependent upon physical states  in the brain.  This is an important notion in cognitive  
research  on the  brain,  and  by finding such a link researchers  hope to find the  connection  
between  the  mental  and  the  physical,  and  thus  an  answer  to the  mind/body problem.   
This  stands  in strong  contrast to  the  enacted  theory  of mind as it is presented  by Alva 
Nöe (2009), who, contrary  to the  beliefs previously discussed in this thesis, urges the 
position of the interaction between body, mind and world as constitution and  explanation  of 
consciousness.  As a base for the enacted theory, Nöe questions the foundation of modern 
neuroscience by pointing to how this foundation is nothing more than an assumption, an 
assumption that the base and constitution of conscious experience is a neuro-scientific 
phenomenon.   According to Nöe there  are  many  reasons,  and  good evidence for his 
attitude, the  main  reason being the  fact  that  no direct  link has  been found.   It  is of course 
possible to find some correlation  between  physical  and  mental  states,  as is proved  by 
amongst others  brain  scanning  and  lesion studies,  but  this  kind  of knowledge says 
nothing about how mental states actually are, or at least could be realized by the neurological 
state.  As this conception of the relationship  between mind and brain does not give an 
explanation  for the phenomenon of interest,  namely consciousness, the whole theory stated  
by physicalism is degraded  to nothing  more than  a, in the  eyes of Nöe, false hypothesis or 
assumption. 
 
4.1 Nöe’s Enacted Approach 
 
The alternative proposed by Nöe is, that instead of thinking about conscious- ness as 
something purely neurological that somehow mysteriously arise and manifests itself in the 
brain, consciousness happens through interaction between several other parts than 
neurological ones.  One of the  reasons for this  is that  neuroscience itself seems to  be quite  
far from finding a solution  to  the  problem  of consciousness,  for as we have seen, even 
though  such cognitive research can be used to recognize correlation  between  neural  and  
mental  states,  the  mystery  has only been moved away from the  brain  as a whole and 
towards  the  neural  structures inside the  brain.   Still the problem is the same, how can such 
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physical states possibly give rise to conscious experience.   This might also be illustrated by 
appealing to what Ned Block (1994) referred to as a difference between access consciousness 
and experiential or phenomenal consciousness. The difference is that  access consciousness is 
equal to those mental states  that  are accessible to functionalism,  or the extrinsic qualities of 
mental states, while experiential  consciousness is characterized  by being intrinsic  subjective  
states, the  way things  feel to  us and  the  way we think  about  something.   This  difference 
speaks in favor of thinking  that  it is possible to talk  about  more than  one type  of mental 
state,  where the first kind is responsible for the extrinsic expression described by 
functionalism,  and the other  for the intrinsic and felt quality  of experience.  The 
physicalistic hypothesis that all mental states somehow spring out of the brain is thus too rash, 
as it is unable to account for states of the second kind.  It is this inability  to explain the 
experiential  aspect of the mental  states,  on the part  of all the physiologically grounded 
theories, that makes Nöe propose that  if one wants to find out what consciousness really is, it 
is necessary to look further  than,  and outside of the brain. The  trick  is, according  to Nöe, 
that  one should stop  thinking  about  consciousness as something  that  happens  inside the  
brain  at  a specific time  and  place.   Instead consciousness should be perceived as an 
ongoing process, set up by the relationship between the mind, body and environment. 
To demonstrate this notion he considers an example of the typical “brain in a vat” 
thought experiment.   If classical neuroscience is right in the hypothesis that consciousness 
arises from the neural network of cells in the brain, a network of cells wired up in a suitable 
manner should be able to give rise to consciousness even without the context and the body of 
a living human being. In such a scenario there could, by the first look of it, in other words be 
conscious brains in a vat.  But is this really all it takes?  According to Nöe, in order for 
consciousness to occur the brain cells in the vat would probably need to resemble a real brain 
in order to have the right components and structure that make consciousness possible.  
Additionally,  the vat  that  provides the surroundings  of the brain  would need to provide the 
right kind of nutrition and the  like for the  brain  to  work,  and  something  would 
additionally  need to  provide some kind of sensible input  for the sake of creating something 
to be conscious about. This scenario seems quite familiar as it clearly resembles how 
consciousness arises in a living body, and this, the presence of life, might be exactly what is 
needed for the constitution, and thus realization of consciousness, even in the brain in a vat 
scenario. Nöe’s conclusion is that  consciousness is made possible due to the  fact that  we are 
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alive, and  as such it is not  plausible  that  research  on the  neural  system  and  brain cells 
alone will yield any significant insight into how consciousness is constituted. 
So consciousness is something that is, at some level, constituted by life, and not 
necessarily only the brain.  This is also evident form research on brain imaging, and the kind 
of information we can hope to get here. Even though it is possible that  brain imaging such as 
fMRI and PET  scans can show some correlations  between the brain and mental  states,  there  
is no direct  explanatory  link between  neural  activity  as it shows up in the scans and 
consciousness.  At least if we are going to believe some of the empirical studies done in the 
field (A.M Owen et.al. 2006), on this link between consciousness and neural activity. They 
found, through  numerous  studies of patients in a so called vegetative  state,  where there  is 
no evidence of consciousness to be found by neither  scanning or personal reports,  that  the 
lack of consciousness at this one point in time does not entail  that  the patient is really brain  
dead.  For surprisingly  it is possible for such patients  to regain and report  full 
consciousness, without  regaining the full kind of neural activity  they possessed before going 
in to the vegetative  state. Neural activity detected through brain scanning is thus not 
sufficient to determine the level of consciousness in a given person (A.M Owen et.al. 2006).  
This is evident from the  fact  that  it  is possible for people who emerge from a vegetative  
state  to regain full consciousness, without  regaining all of the physical states  that  are seen a 
necessary by people who confine to reductive  physicalism.  Of course this  argument is not 
strong enough to show that  there is no correlation  between neural and mental activity,  in 
fact it rather  seems to lend support  from the fact that  such correlation  on average seems to 
hold. More critical is the fact that scanning and imaging of the brain does not give any direct 
insight into the experiential or phenomenal consciousness. They are images of what is going 
on in the brain, but they really do nothing in terms of explaining how we come to experience 
through these neural states, and it is not even sure how accurately they can show the neural 
activity that corresponds to given mental states.   For  one the  activity  in a neural  system  
can  correspond  to  mental content,  but it is plausible that there is feedback between the 
different things we are conscious about  at the given moment of the screening.  Nöe (2009) 
exemplifies with a discussion of what happens when we are aware of a rhyming sound.  At 
the  same time we will both  be conscious of the  rhyming  itself and the  words (language)  
that makes up the rhyme, and as these will intertwine, and “light up” somewhat different areas 
of the  brain,  it is not  possible to determine  exactly  which area corresponds  to the  given 
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mental  state.   This will at least be the fact as long as it is impossible to determine whether a 
person can be conscious of exactly one thing, and exactly what thing this is. 
In Nöe’s (2009) words, these notions point to the fact that it is not the brain that 
thinks, we do (a person or another living being), and to explain how consciousness is 
constituted we need to take more than just the brain into account.  One of the reasons why 
neuroscience has problems with giving an explanation  of how consciousness comes to be, 
and thus  bridge the explanatory  gap (Chalmers  1995) is the sole focus on the brain,  and the 
assumption  that  this is where the explanation  is to be found.  If this is right, it might be a 
tactical maneuver for cognitive science to take a look at the phenomenological/enacted way of 
thinking about and explaining consciousness. Alva Nöe’s (2009) main point  here is that to 
get a clearer glimpse of consciousness, and how it actually  can be explained,  something  
more than  just  the  brain  needs to be taken  into account in order to find out what the actual  
constitution of consciousness is. 
But if the brain is not what (at least not on its own) constitutes consciousness, then 
what is? And how is this alternative explanation for the constitution of the mind able to give a 
better understanding and explanation of consciousness?  What is the actual role of the brain 
seen from this perspective?  In other words, what constitutes consciousness according to Nöe 
and the enacted theory of mind? 
As we have seen, the question goes from being “How does consciousness arise in the 
brain?”  to something  like “How does life, and the interaction between brain, body and  the  
phenomenal  world together  give rise to  consciousness?”.   Nöe, along with Susan Hurley 
(2003), have pointed to the fact that a somewhat artificial boundary is assumed between the 
brain and the rest of the world, including the body.  The fact is rather that consciousness is not 
limited to the nerve cells; the nerve system or even the brain, there is no actual boundary here 
to stop us from incorporating the rest of the body, or even the outside world in the discussion 
of how consciousness comes to be.  Nöe (2009) refers to situations  in which the  neural  
systems of the  brain  do not function as they do in ordinary  living beings to show how it is 
actually  necessary to incorporate  the  way we are situated in the  world as living beings with 
a body.  By appealing  to the  plasticity  of the  brain,  and the  way a young brain  quickly 
adjusts and adopts  to its environment, Nöe shows how the neural activity  itself depends on 
interaction, rather  than  just  input  from the  surrounding  world in order to function as it 
does. This adaption happens through structural wiring in the brain, and as the brain keeps at 
least some of its plasticity over the years the structures can probably be altered throughout a 
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person’s life.  So, as the way we relate to the world change, the structures of physical activity 
in the brain changes with it.  An example related to this is found in an empirical study of the 
brain functions of ferrets (Sur, Angelucci and Sharma 1999). In an experiment the scientists 
blindfolded newborn ferrets to see whether this would affect the later development of vision. 
The result was that  when eyes of the  ferrets  later  were uncovered  they  could still not  see, 
and  the  ability  to develop sight was no longer present.  This shows that a young brain is 
susceptible to influence from the outside world, and that the kind of interaction that is 
undertaken early in life is crucial for how the brain develops.  The brain, and with it the kind 
of mental states and conscious experience we can have is decided by how we interact with the 
world. Speaking of human beings, the way we are socialized, by culture, language and 
relationships to others can all play a role for both the structure of the brain, and in turn the 
way we come to experience the world. Nöe also points to the fact that individual brain cells or 
even areas in the brain does not have an intrinsic quality that makes them responsible for 
giving us the conscious content that  is our experience.  A study  from MIT (Nöe, O’Regan 
2001) shows that  if the neural systems of a brain  is rewired so that  the  neural  pathway  
from the  eye leads to the  auditory  cortex,  and the  pathway  from the  auditory  organ  
winds up in the  visual cortex,  this  does not make the animal hear with its eyes and see with 
its ears.  Instead the auditory cortex takes over the job of the visual cortex and vice versa.  
According to Nöe this kind of plasticity  shows how the  neurons  themselves  are not  
responsible for how the  world shows up in consciousness, and that  the way our body (here 
eyes and ears) interacts with the world has something to say for the brain works as well.  
Even further,  studies  of tactile-visual  substitution have showed that  using an 
apparatus that  substitutes visual input  with  tactile  stimuli  that  correspond  to the image of 
the participants visual field (Bach-y-Rita 1972). The apparatus, engineered by Paul  Bach-y-
Rita  in the  1960’s (Nöe 2009), uses a camera  that  is connected  to an instrument able to 
submit  tactile  stimuli  somehow corresponding  to the  images recorded  by the  camera.   
Remarkably this apparatus made it possible for visually impaired people to “see” what was 
going on in front of them, and they were able to pick up or point to things, as well as hitting a 
ball with a racket.  Like in the case of the rewiring mentioned above, we see here that it is 
possible for a specific type of sensory input to be translated in the brain so that it gives a 
different kind of experience. Even though the sensory input that is given by the sensory 
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substitution apparatus is tactile, a person who is adapted
12
 to the signaling of it will 
experience not only touch, but also a kind of seeing.  The somatosensory cortex of the brain 
that receives the signals does in other words alter the way the signals are experienced.  
Theories that base much of their evidence on finding neural correlates of consciousness is 
thus in for a difficult task.  If there is no intrinsic and given way that  a neural system realizes 
conscious experience,  it  would seem like a bad  idea to look for the  constitution of 
consciousness only here, and instead  of adopting  this identity  theory  hypothesis  one could 
look at  how the  world relates  to us as involved beings.  Neurons in the brain react to the 
way we relate to the world, and make it possible for the system to bring about the experience 
corresponding to our activity, the world is thus of an utmost importance to the way 
consciousness is being facilitated in the brain.  Interaction with the world does in other words 
have a constitutive effect on the brain, here realizing tactile input as visual experience. 
Empirical studies like the ones employed by Alva Nöe shows how the mind is related 
to the body and the world.  But this in itself is not revolutionary thinking. In cognitive science 
and traditional analytic philosophy the fact that body, world and mind interact  is apparent in 
the  because we have a perception  of the  world we live in, made available  through  the  
senses along with the  neural  system.   The  fact that we have such sensory input  is seen as 
crucial for the  content  of the  mental  states, as it directs  the  way we behave in, and relate  
to the  surrounding  world.  It is after all the fact that we get some sort of input from the 
“outside” through our sensory organs, and this input does give some sort of direction to the 
way we behave.  In other words there are causal effects from the sensory input to the 
behavioral output. The influence from the outside world alter the firing of neurons, and thus 
the structures of the brain,  pointing  to a definitive causal effect from the world as it is given 
through our senses to the  physical states  of the  brain.  The fact that  empirical studies  show 
that  the way our bodies are related to the world have an impact of the way the brain looks and 
behave,  does in other  words have a causal relevance for the  way physical reductionism  
(mind/brain identity  theory)  relates  the  world to consciousness.  And from what I have 
mentioned earlier this point is also important for Nöe in his enacted theory.  But, for Nöe, this 
relationship between the world and consciousness is not a purely causal relation, as the way 
consciousness is directed at the world is also seen as constitutionally relevant for 
                                               
12 This kind of adaption is very fast and can be done in minutes and hours rather than days and weeks (Nöe 2009 
p.  57) 
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consciousness.  So the question is, how does Nöe get from this purely causal relationship to 
thinking that the body and the world actually are constitutional for consciousness? 
The notion mentioned above points to a problem in Nöe’s enacted approach. The 
moment of critique is that the enacted explanation of consciousness is inclined to some 
confusion between causal and constitutive relations.  Some of the confusion stem from the 
way Nöe views the relationship between the world and the mind, as he is reluctant to think 
that the world can somehow be torn away from the way we talk about consciousness.  But if 
the world in itself is only causally relevant for the way we are conscious, then there is a 
chance that Nose way of viewing the constitution of consciousness is based on a 
misunderstanding, or confusion of what is to be understood as causally and constitutionally 
relevant for consciousness.  The problem is apparent in the way Nöe uses empirical examples 
to illustrate how the brain and mental states are connected to the world and the body.  The 
examples and connections he makes use of can most of the time easily be referred to as 
causally relevant for an explanation of consciousness,  and  this  is the  way his examples are 
used by cognitive  scientists and  analytical  philosophers  of mind.   Nöe on the  other  hand  
uses the  examples to point to  how the  world (and  body)  are  crucial  for the  fact  that  we 
can  have  any conscious experience at  all, and as such he use the  empirical examples to 
point out how the relation  between the world and “the self” actually  will have to be 
described as a constitutional factor  for consciousness.   A reason  for this  might  be that  Nöe 
and  the  enacted  theory  finds it  difficult,  or even impossible to  separate  the  brain from 
the world and the body.  This notion is to some extent illustrated by the brain in  a  vat  
thought  experiment  that   I mentioned  earlier,  and  the  fact  remains  that Nöe (2009), 
along with other phenomenological thinkers  interpret the evidence given by the  type of 
empirical  studies  I have  discussed  here differently  than  a cognitive scientist.   In the next 
section I will argue that there is at least one way in which it is possible to understand the 
world as a constitutional factor for consciousness. This will also lead to an investigation of 
different readings of Nöe, and how I think these different readings can be used in relation to 
the Hard Problem.   Even so, what we have in front of us here is an objection to how the 
enacted theory accounts for the constitution of consciousness. That  is, if the arguments  
meant to support  the thought that  consciousness is constituted by the  relation  between  
brain,  body and  world is resting on a confusion between what is causally and constitutionally 
relevant,  one of the motivations  for endorsing it is undermined. 
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4.2 A New Understanding of the  Constitution of 
Consciousness 
 
Still, the way phenomenology accounts for consciousness might open up for some new ways 
to understand the role of the body and world in relation to the brain and the mind.   For  it  is 
still  possible to  think  about  the  explanation  for why we are conscious as a result  of the  
way we are related  to the  world, even though  it is difficult to find evidence for it in the 
strictly  analytical  way. One way of viewing this is that it is impossible to separate the 
conscious mind and experience from the way neural activity realizes consciousness.   If this is 
true, the notion naturally leads to a dynamical understanding of consciousness, where a 
constitutive explanation refers to a dynamical process that links neuronal structures and the 
world together.   This dynamical process refers to the way body and mind is related to and 
intended towards the world. The relation can be seen as a dynamical process because it is no 
longer a one way cause to effect relationship, where the environment is seen as the causal 
factor that affects the physical states in the brain, and as such also the experiential, intrinsic 
mental states.  Instead the dynamical understanding of consciousness lets the mind itself take 
an active part in the way the world is constituted in our experience of it. The  point  is that  the  
world does not  “show up”  as long as we do not  relate  to it, the  way the  world is perceived 
by us depends  on our actions  in it.   The structure of consciousness should be understood as 
something more than a receiver of sensory input and a computational processor of 
information.   It should rather be seen as a partaker, as experience first show up when we 
relate to, and act in the world. When consciousness, and the relationship  between the world 
and mental states  is described this  way,  it  opens  up  for an  interpretation where  intrinsic  
(subjective)  aspect  of conscious experience is disclosed in the  extrinsic,  or observable  
aspects  of how we relate to the world. 
  So, even though  the  world might  be seen as causally  linked  to  the  mind  in an 
empirically detectable  way, I will try  to show in what follows that  this does not necessarily  
exclude the  world as a constitutionally relevant,  depending  on how we read and interpret 
Nöe’s enacted  theory. 
If we are to believe Nöe, the plasticity  of the brain  shows how the outer  world makes 
a contribution to the development of consciousness, as the neural structure does not itself 
contain  all the necessary facts about  how we become conscious.  As we see in the example 
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of the sensory substitution experiment, there can be an alteration of experiential content 
without the occurrence of any large scale change in the structure of neuronal patterns in the 
brain (as there is no time to make significant changes or rewiring in the short time it takes for 
a person to adapt to the tactile form of vision). And if the structure of neural activity  is not all 
that  is necessary for the constitution of consciousness, it makes little  sense to only map  out  
the  brain  on the  search  for neural correlates  of consciousness.  Instead  we would also 
necessarily have to take a look at  how the  mind relates  to,  or are intended  towards  the  
world if this  too is a constitutionally important factor.  So according to Nöe consciousness is 
an enactment that happens in our meeting with the world.   When  the body  is in the  world 
we have to adapt  to it,  and  use our bodies when we relate  to it,  and  this  interaction, or 
rather  enactment is what constitutes consciousness, with the brain and its neural activity  
serving  as a facilitator  for the  dynamic  pattern between mind,  body  and brain  (Nöe 2009, 
p.  47).  So Nöe’s enacted  approach  also incorporates  a notion  of embodiment,  as the way 
we come to be conscious depends on the fact that  we have body as much as it depends on 
having a brain (Nöe 2012). The role of the brain is in a sense not diminished as it is still what 
makes the combination of the constitutional parts possible, but it is not the only thing that 
serves as a constitution for mental phenomena and experience.  We need a brain, but this 
brain is of no use as long as we do not have a body and a world in which this body can be put 
to use through thoughtful interaction. As such, experience is not something that happens to us, 
it is something we do, an action seen in the way we relate to the outer world and to other 
bodies which we perceive to be like our own.  That is as an acting and experiencing form of 
life
13
. 
So even though Nöe’s use of empirical studies might be a misunderstanding as far as it 
comes to showing how the world is constitutionally relevant for consciousness, it is still 
possible to interpret the enacted theory as an expression for such a dynamical understanding 
of the relationship between body, world and mind the way I do here. 
The  major  difference between  cognitive/neural science, analytic  philosophy  of 
mind and the enacted approach is thus not that the phenomenological theory takes the brain  
out of the explanation  of consciousness, but  the fact that analytic  philosophy and  science 
                                               
13 This is also the solution to the problem of other minds, a classical problem in analytic philosophy of mind that 
asks the question of how we can have any knowledge of the existence of other conscious beings.  The problem 
arises due to the subjective character of the experiential content of the mind, and works from the hypothesis that 
it is impossible to get a glimpse of what is happening inside the mind of another being, and thus we cannot be 
sure that there is anything going on at all.  For Nöe on the other hand, other people/beings show up for us as 
conscious in the way we relate to them in morally based interaction (see Nöe 2009, p.  25-46). 
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takes  the  world  and,  to  some extent,   the  body  out  of the  equation. In  the  enacted  
theory  of mind  the  brain  does play  a  crucial  role as  a  facilitator for the  occurrence of 
consciousness, but  what  is seen as really constitutional is the body that  relates to the world 
as an intentional being (Heidegger 2007). In classical phenomenological thinking, and also in 
the enacted theory of mind, consciousness is something implicit in the way we relate to, and 
use the world as place where our lives can unfold. Consciousness becomes a kind of 
expression for the fact that we are in the world, implying that the world in a sense necessarily 
shows up for us when we relate to it in a meaningful way. This is a stark contrast to classical 
analytical thinking of the mind and consciousness, which perceives of consciousness as 
something indisputably internal, something that happens in a closed “box” out of reach for 
others.  This notion is nicely formulated in Wittgenstein’s (1997) famous beetle in a box 
thought experiment. Here he imagines that all the people in the world have their own 
designated box containing what everybody refers to as a beetle.  But no one can ever open the 
lid of another person’s box, and as such it is impossible to tell whether every box contains the 
same thing, a “beetle”, or in fact if there is really anything  in the other’s boxes at all 
(Wittgenstein 1997). If the same is a fact of the mental “content” of the brain, consciousness 
is indeed something mystical and inscrutable.  This is not the case according to 
phenomenological thinking, where conscious experience is perceived as something that is 
readily available through the fact that we interrelate and connect to the world with intention 
(Heidegger 2007). This is a notion that is close to how most people actually perceive and 
relate to consciousness in everyday life.  In the  enacted  theory  the  involvement  in the  
world is described  as an acting  relation,  thus  making  consciousness an enactment, 
something  we do, and not something  that  happens  to us because there is  neural  activity in 
the brain. Again we see how the enacted approach sees involvement and our relation to the 
world as constitutionally relevant for consciousness. 
In the light of the discussion of the Hard Problem (Chalmers 1995) of philosophy we 
see a difference between how the two directions, the phenomenological and the classical 
analytical, perceive the problem, and how they think it best can be solved. For classical 
philosophy of mind the problem shows up due to the fact that there is still no completely 
satisfying explanation for how consciousness is constituted by the brain.  I have previously 
gone over some of the alternatives that have been proposed in order to give an adequate 
explanation, but there are still serious problems with all of them.   One crucial mistake  made 
in most  of these theories  is that  they  do not  have any serious suggestions  in terms  of how 
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the  purely  experiential  factor  of mental  states are connected  with  the  neural  activity  of 
the  brain.   Many do not even discuss this seriously, and for others the opacity of conscious 
experience has led thinkers to deny the existence of such states on a whole (Dennett 1991, 
Churchland 1981). In light of the enacted approach  (Nöe 2009) it is, on the other hand, 
possible to hold that  these mental  states  have  an  extrinsic  aspect,  and  that  consciousness 
is readily  available to those who wish to make inquiries on the subject.   The intrinsic and 
experiential qualities of the mental states are in other words visible (extrinsic) in the way we 
relate to the world. 
This  reading  of the  enacted  approach  leads  to  an  interpretation where  it  is 
possible to look at the Hard Problem of consciousness as something that  does not show up in 
the  way it does for classical neuroscience and philosophy  of mind.  It is clear in 
phenomenology that a constitutive explanation of consciousness should provide an 
understanding of how the individuals interaction with the world by virtue of being a sensing 
body gives, or rather shows how the person/being is conscious.  In other words, the Hard 
Problem does not show up for the phenomenological understanding of consciousness at all.  
But  it  still seems to me like there  is a question  connected to exactly  how the brain  
facilitates  the  occurrence of qualia.  If the brain is seen as what somehow enables the 
conscious experience to appear, it is still necessary to get a better understanding of exactly 
how this happens.   It still seems as though the brain has some crucial role to play, and that 
this role is not properly explained by the phenomenological enacted theory.  The 
phenomenological thinker might reply that this is a different question, and that it is not crucial 
to an explanation of consciousness. Instead it should be viewed as a technicality left to the 
hands of the natural sciences, and not a question for philosophy of mind.  Still, 
phenomenology and the way it opens up for an extrinsic understanding of how experiential 
consciousness is constituted might open up for making better explanations of this specific 
aspect of mental states when viewed with the eyes of for example a functionalist, and I will 
pursue this further in what follows in order to find out whether the enacted theory can be a 
supplement to functionalism.  In addition,  the phenomenological account of consciousness as 
it is stated by Alva Nöe (2009) is also open for the interpretation that  there is no real “Hard 
Problem” for philosophy to solve, this too will be discussed further  later in the paper. The 
third option that I will discuss is whether the intrinsic aspect of consciousness is intertwined 
with the neural structures of the brain in a way that makes it impossible to separate between 
intrinsic and extrinsic expressions of conscious experience. If this is the case, and 
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consciousness is a kind of dynamical process between world and mind, then there is no need 
for the physicalistic theories of consciousness to hold that the identification of a mental state 
has to be necessarily extrinsic. 
Functionalism is the  theory,  belonging to the  realm of analytic  philosophy  of mind,  
that  has gotten  furthest  in the  search for an explanation  to the  problematic notion  of 
qualia (Livingstone  2005).  By reducing or identifying mental states with functional states 
rather than purely physical states in the brain, the theory has gotten far in terms of interpreting 
how the psychological states and behavior of a being give an expression of experienced 
consciousness.  
By reducing mental states to functional states, functionalism is also able to make sense 
of (at least to some extent) the problem of mental causation. This  problem  arise due to  the  
dualistic  aspect entailed  in the  formulation  of consciousness as it  is used in relation  to the  
Hard  Problem.   The “what it is like” aspect of consciousness as it is fronted by both Nagel 
(1974) and Chalmers (1995) involves a view of consciousness that can lay the ground for an 
epiphenomenal understanding of consciousness (Yablo 1992).  If consciousness is understood 
as an epiphenomenon this leads to a problem related to how we can account for the causal 
effect from mental states to physical states.  This means that if qualia are not reducible to 
physical states, feelings and intentions such as wanting, wishing and believing can have no 
causal effect on our (physical) behavior.  This view is obviously problematic, as it seems 
highly unlikely that what we consciously wish to do is irrelevant for our behavior.  If mental  
states  can be reduced to physical states,  as the physicalistic mind/body identity  theory  
indicates,  this  problem  does not  show up as there  is no problem of causation  between 
physical entities.  But in the identity theory there seem to be no room for qualitative 
experience either, so the fact that it can provide for an answer to the problem of mental 
causation is of little help. (Role-) functionalism solves this problem by identifying the mental 
states with functional states.  The trick is that functionalism, in order to avoid dualism and its 
adherent problems, such as the here mentioned mental causation, is able to reduce 
consciousness to a physically available level. This kind of reduction is not the same as the 
physical reduction found in the mind/brain identity theory and role filler-functionalism where 
mental states are reduced to brain states. But role-functionalism can still be held as a type of 
reductive theory because of the way mental states are described as functional states. By 
functionalism consciousness is not understood as an epiphenomenon, but as functional states, 
and as such the problem of mental causation is avoided. In other words functionalism is not 
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only successful in terms of avoiding some of the problems associated with physicalism, it is 
also able to account for the problem connected to dualism and epiphenomenalism.  
These functional states are in many cases successful when it comes to saying 
something about our mental states, as these are often expressed in extrinsically available 
expressions of behavior (Kim 2005). But according to amongst others Jaegwon Kim (2005), 
functionalism is still in trouble as far as it comes to accounting for the qualitative aspect of 
consciousness as the quality of experience is not expressed in the functional states.   Kim 
(2005) exemplifies with the inverted spectrum hypothesis
14
  where the way we perceive 
colors has been altered so that every color looks like its opposite (red looks green, and so on). 
According to Kim,  the  qualitative aspect  of the  colors are really irrelevant for the functional  
state,  as long as the  person  with  the  inverted  color spectrum  have  the same relationship  
to, and ability to discriminate  between the colors as a person with “normal”  color vision.   
For  example,  this  means  that  if a person  with  an  inverted color spectrum  perceives grass 
and green salad as having the same color, a color that is opposite of ripe tomatoes  (and so 
on), there is no difference for functionalism,  and the theory  can still make sense of the 
behavioral  response and use it to determine  a functional state.  The qualitative experience is, 
on the other hand, not available in the functional  state,  and  the  way a color (or a wish for 
that  matter) feels to us in our subjective  way of experiencing it is still without  causal power, 
and is thus  unable to account for how we behave.  According to Kim (2005) the intrinsic 
nature of qualia is what makes it unable to be identified with a functional state.  In result, 
further work is needed in order to make functionalism able to account for constitution and rise 
of consciousness. 
If we take  Kim’s (2005) suspicion  that  qualia,  the  distinct  feelings of an  
experience, are impossible to “functionalize”  due to their  intrinsic  character  (i.e., they 
cannot serve as functional  states  because they are not available from a third  person point of 
view, and cannot be put into a scientific system) the adoption of the enacted theory  of 
consciousness might serve as a way to make consciousness open for scientific description.  
The point is that the enacted theory of consciousness characterizes consciousness as an 
extrinsic factor of human life, rather than something that is invisible and closed within a 
wittgensteinian beetle box.  Consciousness is in other words understood as something that lies 
open in the day, and not something that is purely subjective and hidden from the third person 
perspective.  By describing consciousness as something that  happens “outside” the brain, in 
                                               
14 See Chapter 2 
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the meeting between a subject and the  world, it  is possible to say something  objective  about  
conscious experience,  as this experiential  content is apparent in the way we relate  to and use 
the world in a meaningful  way.  If Nöe and  other  phenomenological  thinkers  are right  
about  this, the extrinsic quality  of conscious experience can be used to individuate  and 
describe functional  states,  as they are open for empirical description  and research. 
This thought, that  the  intrinsic,  experiential  qualities  of consciousness can be seen 
as expressed in the  way we relate  to the  world has led to a notion  about  the naturalizability 
of phenomenology.  The project is undertaken by amongst others Petitot,  Varela, Thompson  
and Nöe himself in the book “Naturalizing  Phenomenology” (1999), and is directed  towards  
making  the  phenomenological  understanding of the world available to empirical study  
through  various experiments  and examples.  Success on this field might plausibly make it 
easier to point out the “intrinsic” states that are necessary to supplement functionalism, even 
though the project collides somewhat with Husserl’s (1913) own view, that phenomenology 
should not be naturalized due to its a priori character, or the fact that both the world and we, 
as conscious beings are something given, just by being in the world. If, on the other hand, the 
project is successful, as Nöe’s enacted theory hopes to be, this could provide a logical frame- 
work for functionalism in which conscious experience (qualia) can be referred to as functional 
states, enabling it to give a functionalistic explanation of the relationship between the 
body/brain and consciousness. 
To summarize, my thought is that there are several ways to read the phenomenological 
enacted theory of mind.   The first one I have discussed investigates an interpretation of the 
enacted approach where the intrinsic, experiential states are not only intrinsic and experienced 
by the subject, but also available to a third person point of view, made visible in the way we 
relate to the world.  This reading depends on Nöe’s argument (2009, 2012) about how the 
world and the body, or rather how the body acts within this world plays a crucial role for how 
the mind is constituted. For  Nöe it is nothing  less than  a fact that  through  this  relation  we 
enact  our own consciousness,  and  this  enactment or action  is in my  reading  of Nöe taken  
to  be constitutional for consciousness.   If this  is true,  then  consciousness,  as long as the 
term  is used to  include  experiential  and  qualitative aspects,  can be understood  as 
something that  is open to all, and not something that  is hidden inside of our brains, like 
Wittgenstein’s  beetle is locked into its box.  This can in some respects be com- pared to how 
we all, according to Heidegger (2007) relate to the world in a state of moodedness, or with 
care (sorge) towards our own actions.  This moodedness directs the way we relate to the 
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world, but it is also a reflection of our internal states or experience of the world.  When  the  
enacted  theory  of mind is understood  this  way it can be linked closely to functionalism,  as 
the problematic  intrinsic  states  now are open for inspection.   In other  words, the  functional  
states  that  are expressed in behavior and the relation they bear to sense-input  and other 
mental states can be taken to include  the  “intrinsic”  states  that  are,  according  to 
Haugeland  (1978) and  Kim (2005), unavailable  and out of reach for classical functionalism 
 
4.3 Some Interpretations of Nöe’s Approach to 
Consciousness 
 
The problem with this kind of reading is that it is still unclear exactly how the brain and 
neural processes are related to the occurrence of consciousness.  If one is ready  to  agree with  
the  statement that  consciousness is enactment, and  that  it  is constituted by the  way we 
relate  to the  world, there  is still a problem,  or at  least unclarity  connected  to the role of 
the brain.  It seems to me that  in the case spelled out  here, the  brain  must  at  least  play 
some part  on the  way to consciousness, but no answer,  or even speculation  is given as to 
how exactly  this  happens.   In a way the Hard Problem is altered, and is no longer 
understood as a constitutive question of how consciousness is realized. Rather it is an inquiry 
of what makes the brain able to give rise to consciousness when it interacts with the body and 
its actions in the world. This is at least one way to interpret Nöe’s enacted approach, and we 
do, in other words, still not have a full understanding of experiential consciousness.  But  this  
kind of reasoning  also points to the  important  problem  for traditional philosophy  of mind,  
and especially neuro science, and helps sort  some of this  problem  out.    
The  problem  I refer to is, again, that  neuroscience and analytical  philosophy has a 
tendency  to look away from, or at least take little  notice of consciousness as it appears  
through  the kind of trained  introspection  performed by phenomenological thinkers  
(Laughlin 1999). Consciousness itself is clearly a phenomenological concept as it is, for 
everybody, reached though introspection, as our knowledge of consciousness just because we 
are conscious beings capable of this kind of introspection.    Knowledge about consciousness 
is thus gained by introspection, and it is thus necessary to use some introspective techniques 
in order to fully understand it.  And a full understanding of consciousness is necessary, as it is 
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the explanandum for both philosophy of mind and neuroscience.  But, as mentioned,  this is 
often overlooked by many who try to explain the phenomenon of consciousness, and 
explanations  tends  to lack sufficient  substance  when it comes to tackle the question of such 
phenomenal  consciousness. In order to make good and correct theories about experiential 
consciousness, a thorough understanding of the concept is needed, and it  is thus clear that any 
such theory would benefit a great deal from phenomenological and introspective analysis.  
For example I think much of the reason why philosophers such as Daniel Dennett and others 
who comply with eliminative theories do not sufficiently take into account this notion of how 
our understanding of consciousness is made possible. According to this it should be seen as 
beneficial for neuroscience and analytical philosophy of mind to take phenomenological 
analysis of consciousness into account in order to make out a good explanation for how 
consciousness is realized.  This is not unlike what is done by phenomenological thinkers such 
as Nöe, who in order to make a naturalized phenomenology for the sake of explaining 
consciousness make use of empirical, neuro-scientific experiments and research.  The benefit 
given by this kind of mixture of neurology and phenomenology is that it gives a wider and 
hopefully more exact way to understand and explain consciousness.  Additionally, the 
problem I mentioned above can be solved by diminishing how we see the constitutional role 
of the brain. This notion will be further discussed later in this thesis. 
Another way to interpret and another possible consequence of Nöe’s enacted approach 
is that the Hard Problem can be denied all together.  This thought is quite common for 
phenomenological thinkers such as for example Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi (2008), and 
the notion depends largely on an interpretation of how conscious- ness is constituted. In Nöe’s 
enacted theory, and in the phenomenological perspective on consciousness more generally, 
the constitution of consciousness is found “beyond the brain”, in the relation between mind, 
body and brain, and the way these relate to the world as a place where life can unfold.  In the  
previous section I state  that this  kind  of constitutive understanding can  make  it  possible to  
view the  intrinsic states  of experience as really being extrinsic.  This corresponds to a 
dynamical view of how consciousness is related to the world, and the way this view makes it 
difficult and unnecessary to distinguish between these two kinds of states.   Instead they are 
understood as the same thing, as intrinsic states can be understood to have extrinsic qualities 
and the other way around.  This is because experiential content is visible in the way we relate 
to the world, and not least to other people.  The notion of a state that is only intrinsic can be 
avoided in this way, as they are now taken to have an extrinsic aspect, presented in the 
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“outside” world, and expressed in the way we relate to the world.  If this is accepted it implies 
that the Hard Problem of consciousness does not show up for phenomenology, at least not in 
the same way as it does for an analytic philosopher of mind. 
According to Chalmers (1995) the Hard Problem can be defined as the problem of 
bridging the gap between physical states in the brain and experiential consciousness, and  an  
explanation  of this  will need to  describe  the  way consciousness is realized by describing  
the  relationship  between  consciousness and  the  physical  world.  This mystery rests on the 
“assumption” (Nöe 2009) that experiential mental states really are produced or realized by the 
brain.   But  if it  is room for disagreeing  with  this premise, it is also possible to argue that  
there actually  are no such difference between the  mental  and  the  physical,  and  as such 
there  is no reason to think  that  there really is a “hard  problem” to be solved. And 
disagreeing with the premise is exactly what Nöe does.  For him it is more relevant how to 
look at what  (causally)  changes the  structure of the  neural  circuits  of the  brain,  than  how 
these circuits  themselves are the origin of conscious experience, and as such the constitution 
of consciousness is to be found here, out in the world.  So consciousness is constituted by the 
world, or rather, our relation to it, and the way we act.   The notion the consciousness is 
visible and out in the open is also a clearly intuitive thought, as it reflects the way we relate to 
other thinking subjects.  But when consciousness is perceived as constituted by our 
(conscious) presence in the world, the brain itself seems to be left out of the equation, as far as 
it comes to being an essential factor for consciousness.  It is seen as an organ, along with all 
the others, necessary for us to be alive.  The role of the brain is to process sense data, and 
makes us able to relate to the world, but its role is limited to purely causal matters. The 
question of how consciousness is realized by brain in this relation does not arise simply 
because consciousness is this relation itself. Consciousness is in other words the mind and 
body (with brain) that relates to and acts in the world. 
According to this interpretation then, the Hard Problem just does not show up. As such 
the  enacted  approach  certainly  “helps”  to  solve the  hard  problem  of consciousness; by 
denying that  the problem is even there.
15
  This notion seems to be questionable for many 
                                               
15 This notion bears an interesting similarity to eliminative theories of consciousness, even though this kind of 
theory must on a whole be regarded as the diametrically opposite of the phenomenological account.  The  
similarity  stems  from the  fact  that the  eliminative  approach denies the  existence  of the hard  problem of 
consciousness, just as many phenomenological  positions  do.  And surprisingly  it seems like they  both  arrive  
at  this  account due to a notion  that there  are actually  no fundamental difference between  mental  states  and  
physical  states.    But here stops the similarities.    For  while phenomenology  sees consciousness  as the way  
we are  physically  present  in the  world,  something that thus  has  no mystical  origin  in physical  states  in the  
brain.   Here the world is consciousness, and consciousness is the world.  In other words there is no difference 
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reasons.  One of them is the method by which the conclusion is derived, as this seems to be 
somewhat distanced from scientific and empirical studies, instead it is more of a folk 
psychological type of theory and a demystification of consciousness.   This  might  be a good 
thing  when it  is used to provide  a structure for what the exact object/phenomenon of study  
is, but for a scientist,  or an analytic philosopher  for that  matter, it  would seem close to  no 
explanation  at  all,  as it  is not based on facts that  are scientifically verifiable. Rather, 
phenomenology lends its support purely from the kind of “skilled” introspection that is typical 
for phenomenological philosophy.   Alva Nöe tries  to  use a naturalized kind  of 
phenomenology  on order to make an empirical foundation  for his theory,  but these are all 
identifications of causal links between the way the living subject relates to the world, and as 
such a constitutive explanation  is not really available through  the kind of evidence he makes 
use of.  On the  other  hand  this  reading  or interpretation might be too strong,  and Nöe’s 
enacted  approach  should not  necessarily be seen as an effort to deny the  existence of a 
relation  between brain  and conscious experience, or the existence of an intrinsic  aspect  in 
experience.  Even so, it could still be seen as an independent effort to find an answer to the 
Hard Problem of consciousness, and thus an explanation of the mind/body problem.   Even so, 
if we disagree with  the  notion  that  the  explanation can stand  alone as an explanation  of 
consciousness, Nöe’s approach  to the  philosophy of mind can, beneficially, be seen as an 
effort to change the  way we regard  the boundaries  between  the  physical and the  mental.   
A better  interpretation of this  is that  Nöe suspends some of the boundaries between the 
physical and the mental,  and the  intrinsic  and  extrinsic  aspects  of conscious states  in a 
way that  gives a better understanding of consciousness in favor of a more coherent and 
sufficient explanation of the relation  between mind and brain. 
This last reading of Nöe is better  in terms  of portraying the suggestions actually 
found in the enacted approach,  as it relates to the dynamical description  of the relationship  
between  consciousness, brain  and  our bodily relation  to the  world.  In addition it seems to 
be the best in terms of being useful to better the understanding of the dynamical character of 
the relationship between these “parts”.  This dynamical character implies that the lines drawn 
out by analytic philosophy of mind and cognitive (neuro) science are somewhat artificial.  
                                                                                                                                                   
between the physical word out there and the way we experience it consciously (Husserl 2012).  A line drawn 
between the two would thus be artificial.   Eliminative theories  on the  other  hand  denies  the  existence  of an  
explanatory gap on account that there  are no such thing  as conscious experience (Dennett 1991). Mental states 
are nothing over and above the physical states of the brain.  In a way we are machines,  and  neural structures are  
the  components  of the  machinery, and  consciousness  understood as subjective  and intrinsic  experience 
cannot be explained  by this system,  and so have no place in it. 
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The lines that are drawn between body (brain) and mind, between the subjective and the 
objective, and between the world and the person, in many ways echoing the words of 
Descartes meditations (2013) and the dualism we find here.  This kind of dualism is found in 
the boundaries mentioned above, and is by all means one of the main reasons for the 
occurrence of the Hard Problem.   The  dynamical  description,  or understanding of the  
relationship  between perception,  bodily involvement and awareness and conscious 
experience opens up for a different understanding, and,  to  a large  degree  eliminates  these  
boundaries.    By appealing to the process by which we become conscious as an interaction 
between all of them.   Mental  processes are as such not  understood  as processes in the  brain 
alone, but  are described as a process that  stretches  out,  and incorporates  both  the body and  
the  surrounding  environment.  In other  word we should not  draw  a line between intrinsic  
states  and corresponding  extrinsic states,  or between the fact that we are living beings (with  
a brain)  and  consciousness, they  are as two  sides of the same thing, and are intertwined 
with each other in a way that  makes it impossible to separate  them  in terms  of attributing 
the fact that we have conscious experience to one rather  than  the other. 
This  notion,  that  the  line traditional analytic  philosophy  of mind,  along with 
cognitive  neuroscience draws  between  the  intrinsic  and  extrinsic  gives a somewhat 
artificial  understanding of consciousness can be used to create  a dynamical  form of 
explanation,  in an effort to find a solution  to the  hard  problem.   This  kind  of approach  
takes  into account both  the  phenomenological  description  of how conscious- ness “work”, 
in terms of how the mind is structured in order for experiential  content to be present,  along 
with the progressive work found in modern neuroscience on the relation between 
consciousness and the brain.  The premise for this kind of research is that there is actually no 
real, static boundary between consciousness and the world, or between extrinsic and intrinsic 
“parts” of mental content.  These two ways of looking at consciousness does not really belong 
in different spheres, but are intertwined and work together in order to realize the experiential 
content of the mind.  On this account it  is natural to  make  use of both  the  
phenomenological  approach  to  consciousness, as well as the knowledge we have of the 
relation  between brain and mind from neuroscience. 
This understanding of how consciousness is embodied, and dependent on a relation to 
the world can yield different kinds of theories or efforts to merge the phenomenological 
understanding of consciousness as embodied and related to the world, and explanatory models 
that are closer to those of natural science. Tononi (2000), as I mentioned above, uses a 
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description of the dynamical structure of consciousness as it is described here
16
 as a way to 
gain a better understanding of the structures that underlie consciousness. The point is to create 
a phenomenological account or analysis of consciousness in order to lay the ground for a 
neuro-scientific explanation of consciousness. Again the point is that consciousness needs to 
be properly understood in itself, for the sake of giving an adequate explanation
17
  of its 
occurrence or realization. 
So the dynamical understanding of consciousness can be used as a more steady 
foundation for explanations of consciousness, and works as a neat way for clearing out the 
kind of explanation that would do the job of accounting for the realization of consciousness. 
Or at least it works well to weed out those explanations that do not give adequate results in 
terms of explaining the structural features of consciousness as they are described by 
phenomenology.  This can, as mentioned before be seen in relation to a role filler kind of 
functionalism, as the phenomenological description of consciousness is seen, and used as a 
functional state that points to the (underlying) neuronal states, as they are, or at least should 
be explained by modern neuroscience. This  again can be used to point to how there  is quite  
a strong  connection  between phenomenology, here understood as embodied, dynamical 
theories, and functionalism. When used as by Tononi (2000) and other similar thinkers,  it is 
also possible to draw a line to role filler functionalism,  while the  kind of work done by Nöe 
(2009) and amongst  other  Susan Hurley are better  understood  in relation  to role 
functionalism, where the functional  states  themselves are found in the dynamical interaction 
between the environment and the embodied brain.  These are not the words of Nöe himself, 
but it is striking how well the two fits together.   In role functionalism  it is seen as 
unnecessary  to  point to  neural  states  in order  to  determine  and  denote mental  states,  
and instead  functional  states do the job.  As such the constitution of consciousness is found 
in the way sensory input,  different (other)  mental  states  and the  behavioral  output are  
related,  and  if functionalism  can  be supplemented  with the  enacted  approach  for the  sake 
of also being able to  account for the  seemingly intrinsic,  felt qualities  of experience, it is a 
promising solution to the  hard  problem of consciousness. As far as I can see this should be 
seen as a logical extension of role functionalism as long as Nöe’s approach is held as giving a 
                                               
16 Though  Tononi’s  strategy is based  on a wider understanding of phenomenology,  and  does not use Nöe’s 
enacted  approach directly,  the  dynamical  understanding of consciousness  is present  in both  theories. 
17 For  more  information about  Tononi’s  project,  see for example  “A universe  of consciousness  : 
how matter becomes imagination” (2000). 
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correct description of the structures and constitution of consciousness, and hopefully this can 
be used in order to solve the Hard Problem of the relation between body and mind. 
One of the reasons for the good fit between functionalism and enacted/embodied 
phenomenology  is that  they  are both  in a way reductive  theories,  as they  both  see 
consciousness as something that  can be explained by an underlying structure or phenomenon.  
In other words consciousness can be reduced to, and explained in terms of the dynamical 
process between perception, embodiment, and the way we are related to the world.  
Consciousness, with  its experiential  features  is understood  as some- thing  factual,  and  is 
possible through  the  way we are situated in the  world as this gives us something to be 
conscious of. But in the case of Nöe (and role functionalism) consciousness is not 
(necessarily) reducible to physical structures in the brain. 
One of the important points in Nöe’s enacted approach is that there is no point in 
looking for neural correlates of consciousness in the brain, as a strategy for explaining 
consciousness.  The constitution of consciousness is not to be found here, but should rather be 
understood as an expression for the way we are situated in the world as acting subjects.  The 
role of the brain is important because it facilitates a way in which body, brain and world are 
able to interact, and consciousness itself is constituted by this relation.  This understanding is 
compatible with functionalism, and can to even be seen as a functionalistic kind of 
explanation on its own, if we refer to the enactment of consciousness as a functional state.   
So maybe Nöe is right in thinking  that  it is unnecessary,  and even impossible to find the 
constitution of consciousness when the scope of the  search  is limited  to  the  brain,  and  that  
there  is actually  no point  at all to point  to a specific neuronal  correlate  to consciousness in 
the  explanation,  as the constitution is not to be found here at all.  And when this is 
supplemented with role functionalism, it can make sense also within an analytically angled 
tradition of philosophy of mind.   My conclusion is thus  that  there  are a way in which to 
read, and  interpret Nöe that  works well within  an  analytical  perspective  on philosophy of 
mind.  Just  by changing how the  constitution of consciousness is understood,  by 
incorporating  the way we relate to the world as subjects instead of passive, receiving objects, 
much can be done in relation  to answering the Hard Problem in philosophy of mind.  At least 
it goes to show that there is more to consciousness than what we seeing when we look inside 
the head and study the brain. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
In this thesis I have discussed a way of supplementing functionalism with a modified reading 
of Alva Nöe’s enacted approach.  The conclusion I propose is that, since role-functionalism  
allows for consciousness to be identified with functional  states, it should be possible, with a 
phenomenologically  inspired  understanding of conscious- ness, to interpret the  functional  
states  as also comprising the  phenomenological  aspects of subjective experience.  In this 
way consciousness, with the experiential aspect of qualia can be accounted for with a 
supplemented functionalism. 
I have discussed the distinction between role filler-functionalism and role- 
functionalism, as these two interpret the relationship between consciousness and functional 
states differently.  I also propose two different ways in which phenomenology can be used to 
supplement these functionalist theories. 
First,  role-functionalism  holds  that   consciousness can  be identified  with  the 
functional  states  themselves, but the theory runs into some problems in the effort to answer  
the  hard  problem  because  subjective  experience is not  part  of the  way the functional  
states  are described.  This is because the functional states are classically used to refer to the 
relationship between sensory input, behavioral output and other relevant mental states.   The 
problem for role-functionalism in relation to conscious- ness as it is understood in the Hard 
Problem is that these functional states do not entail experiential consciousness. Rather they 
are comprised of empirically observable instances, or more accurately the relationship 
between sensory input, behavior and other relevant metal states.  We could in other words 
imagine one of Chalmers’ zombies having the relevant functional state, even though it lacks 
conscious experience (Chalmers 1996). But by supplementing functionalism with an enacted 
understanding of consciousness, it might be possible to describe functional states as 
containing an expression for experience and subjective consciousness.  This is because the 
subjective aspect of experience can be seen as something that is actually visible in the way we 
relate to the world according to the enacted theory. 
In the case of role filler-functionalism the functional states are understood differently, 
as they are rather used as pointers out the underlying physical states responsible for the 
realization of consciousness. The job for the functional  states  is thus to point to,  or denote  
the  physical  states  responsible  for the  mental  states.   My conclusion here is that it is 
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possible to make use of the phenomenological description as a starting point for a neuro-
scientific explanation.   The point  is that  phenomenology  offers a thorough  description  of 
the  way the  mind is and of how it operates  in relation  to the world, and this gives a solid 
ground on which a physiological theory of mind can be built.  This is similar to what is done 
by Tononi (2000) and the supporters of the Canberra plan.  These kinds of theories see it as a 
mission to uncover the underlying, or a priori structures of consciousness in order to create an 
operational theory of consciousness and experience. The way these two are connected to 
phenomenology is that they use the outlines found here as a premise for how consciousness 
should be explained.  By setting this up as a starting point, both Tononi and the supporters of 
the Canberra plan get a clearer understanding of how a physical explanation must be in order 
for the conscious aspects described by phenomenology to be realized. 
I have also pointed to another suggestion, where the answer to the Hard Problem is to 
explain the whole thing away.   This conclusion depends on a specific reading where the 
constitution of consciousness is understood as visible in the way we are present in the world; 
as conscious and acting subjects.  If consciousness is understood in this way, as something 
implicit in the way we are in and relate to the world, the Hard Problem of answering the 
question of consciousness does not even arise.  A critique of this view involves an attitude 
where this explanation is understood as both unclear and unscientific, and I think 
phenomenology has a better chance of gaining support as a supplement to analytic philosophy 
rather than as an independent alternative. 
These conclusions have been reached through a discussion of several approaches to 
how the Hard Problem can be answered, and I have especially focused on three ways to 
understand the Hard Problem.  For Chalmers (1995) the problem shows up due to the 
subjective character of mental states (consciousness), and the fact that these are out of reach 
of ordinary science, because they are not empirically accessible through an investigation of 
the brain.  It is, on the other hand, possible to find correlations be- tween the different 
physical states of the brain and the reported conscious experience of a subject, but as these are 
merely correlations, they do not in themselves have any explanatory value.  This  fact that  
there  is no evidence for subjective  consciousness to be found in the brain is used by some 
supporters  of reductive  physicalism such as Daniel Dennett  (1991), to maintain  that  as 
long as there  is no evidence for experiential  consciousness to be found in the brain  (above 
the mentioned correlation),  we really have no reason to think that  consciousness exists at all. 
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If this is the case, then there is no reason to even talk about a Hard Problem in relation to 
consciousness, as a thing that does not exist is in no need of an explanation. 
This thought is similar to the reading of the enacted theory mentioned above, but apart 
from this the two theories differ significantly.  In my opinion, the fact that phenomenology 
takes the notion of consciousness seriously, and seeks to account for how it actually  is to be 
in a state  of consciousness, is exactly what gives this theory an advantage in relation  to the  
Hard  Problem.   An advantage that is evident from how phenomenology and the enacted 
approach are used in this thesis, as a supplement to analytic philosophy and functionalism.    
For by widening the perception of the constitution of consciousness, it is possible to explain 
the experiential content of mental states in a way that relates to the physical description of the 
world. This notion can in turn be beneficial in the effort to explain the Hard Problem of 
philosophy of mind. 
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